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At the request of the Executive Branch, courts routinely
dismiss private suits against sitting heads of foreign states.
Congress has never delegated authority to the Executive Branch
to identify principles governing head of state immunity. The
courts' practice thus appears inconsistent with the conventional
view that the Executive Branch lacks authority to affect private
rights unless authorized by Congress to do so. This Article
argues that the Executive Branch'spracticeof determining head
of state immunity is an example of sole executive lawmaking,
deriving from the President's constitutionalresponsibility as the
only authorized representative of the United States in its
relations with foreign states. The President accordingly has
some inherent, though limited, lawmaking authority under
Article II of the Constitution. The Article supports this doctrinal
argument by examining the separation-of-powers concerns
underlying the courts' historic deference to executive branch
determinations of foreign state immunity, prior to the
codification of that subject in 1976. It considers objections that
the Executive Branch's authority to determine head of state
immunity is more plausibly grounded in the Reception Clause
than in the President's more general power to conduct the
nation's diplomacy, and that head of state immunity
determinations are not really lawmaking. The Article concludes
by consideringthe respective roles of Congress and the courts in
determining and applying principles of head of state immunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Under a common view of the constitutional separation of powers,
the Executive Branch is fully subservient to the Legislature when it
comes to making law. The Constitution vests all legislative powers in
Congress and none in the President.' The Supreme Court has long
construed Article I's Vesting Clause as permitting "no delegation of
those powers." 2 But whatever force a formalistic conception of
legislative powers may have had in the early Republic, it quickly
eroded. 3 For most of our constitutional history, the prohibition
against delegation of legislative authority has been highly
permissive. 4 The Supreme Court has upheld broad delegations of
lawmaking power to administrative agencies, provided that Congress
"clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to
apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority."5
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's non-delegation jurisprudence
reflects the idea that the Constitution assigns to Congress alone the
authority to make the law.6 Accordingly, it is generally accepted that
"all executive officials," including the President, "must exhibit some
statutory warrant at least when their conduct invades the private
rights of American citizens."7

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.").
2.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
3.
See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may
rightfully exercise itself. . . . The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to
those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.").
4.
See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) ("[Tlhe nondelegation barrier, never very sturdy, has collapsed. Only
the fiction remains." (footnote omitted)). The high point of the nondelegation doctrine
occurred in 1935 when the Supreme Court issued its only decisions holding
unconstitutional statutes delegating legislative authority to the Executive Branch.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating § 3
of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which empowered the President to implement
"codes of fair competition"); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating
§ 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the President to

prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum produced
in excess of the amount permitted by state quotas).
5.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
6.
As the Supreme Court explains it, the "intelligible-principle rule seeks to
enforce the understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and
so may delegate no more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement
its statutes." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996). In this Article, I use
"lawmaking" broadly to denote the creation of rules of prescriptive force, capable of
prospective application, whether regulating primary or secondary conduct.
7.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 5. In this Article, I use "private rights" to
denote individual rights established by common law or statute that can be "enforce[d]
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The Constitution's grant of authority to the President is thought
to lead to the same result. Article II of the Constitution identifies very
few specific powers of the Presidency. 8 Only two of them expressly
relate to lawmaking: the President can suggest legislation to
Congress, and he has the power to veto bills presented to him by
Congress.9 Neither of these powers authorizes the President to make
law on his own. 10 And while some have argued that the general
grants of authority-vesting the "executive Power" in the President"
and directing the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"' 2-are independent sources of sole executive lawmaking
power,13 that view has not been dominant.14

on private initiative in the law courts." Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346
U.S. 485, 496 (1953).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to veto bills
8.
presented by Congress); id. art. II, § 2 (making the President Commander in Chief of
the armed forces and giving the President the power: to require opinions of heads of
Executive Departments, to grant pardons; to make treaties and appoint foreign and
domestic affairs officials, all with the advice and consent of the Senate; and to make
recess appointments); id. art. II, § 3 (giving the President the power: to recommend
legislation to Congress; to convene and adjourn Congress in extraordinary
circumstances; to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; and to commission
officers of the United States).
9.
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. The Constitution also makes the
Vice-President the President of the Senate, with the power to vote only to break ties.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
10.
The President can make law by entering into treaties with foreign states.
See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make treaties); id. art. VI,
§ 2 (making treaties "the supreme Law of the Land"). But the President can commit the
United States domestically to a treaty only with the concurrence of "two thirds of the
Senators present." Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Thus, the Treaty Clause does not give the
President independent lawmaking power.
11.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
12.
Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
13.
579, 701-04 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that President Truman's seizure
of steel mills without express statutory warrant was authorized under the Take Care
Clause). Hamilton proposed that the Article II Vesting Clause gave the President a
substantive grant of power, presumably all the executive powers historically exercised,
except those the Constitution specifically assigned to Congress or to both political
branches. See Alexander Hamilton, PACIFICUS NO. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JUNE 1793-JANUARY 1794, at 39 (Harold C.
Syrett et al. eds., 1969) ("The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the
EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the
exceptions and qu[a]lificationswhich are expressed in the instrument.").
There is significant debate about the Founders' understanding of executive
authority and whether the Article II Vesting Clause is a source of inherent presidential
authority. Compare, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION's TEXT IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (2007) (arguing that the Vesting Clause is the principal source of executive
branch authority over foreign affairs), and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael Ramsey,
The Executive Power over ForeignAffairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (same), with Curtis
A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs,
102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (disputing textual and historical arguments supporting
Vesting Clause as source of executive foreign policy authority), and Robert J.
Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259 (2009) (arguing that
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The notion that the President has no independent lawmaking
authority sits uneasily with the courts' practice of dismissing private
lawsuits at the direction of the Executive Branch. Over the past fortyfive years, private litigants have sued sitting foreign heads of state
about thirty times. In almost every case, the government has
appeared to "suggest" the defendant's immunity from suit and to
inform the court that it must dismiss the suit.1 5 With few exceptions,
the court deferred to the Executive Branch's assertion of immunity.16
And in no case did a court require a foreign official to stand suit
despite the Executive Branch's assertion of head of state immunity.' 7
By directing the dismissal of suits regardless of the merits of the

implied presidential powers must be derived solely from the enumerated powers
granted by the Constitution to the President).
14.
See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) ("[The Take Care
Clause] allows the President to execute the laws, not make them."); Steel Seizure, 343
U.S. at 587 ("In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.")
(rejecting the argument that presidential seizure order unauthorized by statute was an
exercise of the President's constitutional executive power); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 117 (1926) ("The vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws."); see also Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 849 (1975) ("[It is at least
reasonable to hold that [the executive] power is at best interstitial and ancillary to the
policy-forming powers of Congress."); Monaghan, supra note 4, at 24 (arguing that
powers implied from the Article II Vesting Clause "provide[] no basis for a claim that
the President can disregard the will of Congress or invade the private rights of
American citizens without statutory warrant"); Reinstein, supra note 13, at 336
(arguing that the President's "implied powers cannot change domestic laws or impose
new legal obligations without congressional authorization").
15.
Although denominated a "suggestion" of immunity, the government's filing
informs the courts that the Executive Branch's immunity determination is binding.
See, e.g., Corrected United States' Motion to Vacate October 21, 2002 Order and
Statement of Interest or, in the Alternative, Suggestion of Immunity at 15, Plaintiff A
v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (No. 02C 7530) [hereinafter United
States Suggestion of Immunity] (informing the court that the State Department's
suggestion of head of state immunity for Chinese President Jiang requires dismissal of
the suit). The government typically appears in such private litigation pursuant to a
statute authorizing an "officer of the Department of Justice" to appear in any court "to
attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United
States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006).
16.
The cases are listed below in Appendix A, infra, which also describes the
few suits involving head of state immunity in which the United States did not
participate.
17.
In two anomalous cases, a court declined to accept as controlling the
Executive Branch's suggestion of head of state immunity. However, those courts either
dismissed the suit against the foreign official on other grounds, or held that the
Executive Branch appropriately could assert head of state immunity in subsequent
litigation against the foreign official. See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F.
Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Wilson, 94 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989). I discuss
the Marcos case below in the text accompanying notes 433-45 and in Appendix A,
infra, note 450. I also discuss the Wilson case in Appendix A, infra.
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claims, the Executive Branch limits litigants' private rights.18 That
is, it engages in lawmaking.1 9 No statute authorizes the Executive
Branch to direct couits to dismiss suits against foreign heads of
state.2 0 And Congress has codified no standards governing the
justiciability of suits against foreign officials. 21 Thus, if the Executive
Branch has authority to direct the dismissal of a suit, that power
must derive from the Constitution. 22
In this Article, I propose that the Executive Branch's authority to
determine head of state immunity derives from a specific
constitutional power assigned exclusively to the President-the power
to conduct the nation's diplomacy with foreign states.2 3 In making
this proposal, I take up Henry Monaghan's idea in The Protective
Power of the Presidency that "the President's 'specific' constitutional
powers, such as the Commander-in-Chief power and the powers
'implied' from presidential duties, now (whatever the original
understanding) imply some independent presidential law-making

See supra note 7 (defining "private rights"); infra Part III.D.2 (explaining
18.
how executive branch suggestions of immunity affect private rights),
See supra note 6 (explaining conception of "lawmaking" used in this
19.
Article); infra Part III.D.2 (defending proposition that executive branch suggestions of
immunity constitute lawmaking); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983)
(finding that an action having "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons" is "essentially legislative").
See Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) ("There is
20.
no prescribed statutory procedure for such filing.").
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to
21.
specify the circumstances under which private litigants may sue foreign states. Pub. L.
No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611
(2006 & Supp. II 2008)). But the Supreme Court recently held that "[tihe immunity of
officials simply was not the particular problem to which Congress was responding
when it enacted the FSIA." Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010).
Congress has enacted a limited number of rights of action against foreign officials.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (Supp. II 2008) (creating right of action against foreign
state official for acts of state sponsored terrorism); Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2006)) (creating right of action against any individual committing torture or
extrajudicial killing while acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation"). But the Supreme Court has held that the creation of a right of
action does not determine the antecedent question of whether a foreign official is
immune from suit. Samantar,130 S. Ct. at 2288 n.11.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) ("The President's authority
22.
to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself."') (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
23.
When referring to the President's power to conduct the nation's diplomacy,
I have in mind what I call the "mechanics" of diplomacy-the ability to speak
authoritatively on behalf of the United States in the nation's dealings with foreign
counterparts. This power differs from (or at least is not coextensive with) the power to
determine the nation's foreign policy positions. There is an important disagreement
about the political branch's respective authority to determine the United States' foreign
policy, see for example, sources cited infra note 234, a dispute this Article does not join.
The argument here does not depend on any particular resolution of that issue.
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power."2 4 Monaghan recognized as examples of presidential
lawmaking assertions of foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of
states.25 He did not, however, identify a constitutional basis for that
authority or endorse the Executive Branch's claimed role in making
immunity determinations. 26 Moreover, Monaghan suggested that
Congress's 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
"seems to have precluded any independent 'regulatory' role."27 But
Congress did not displace the Executive Branch's role in determining
the immunity from suit of foreign heads of state.28 Thus, it would be
useful to know whether the Executive Branch's lawmaking is
constitutionally sanctioned. 29

24.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 54; see also Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power
of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1050 (1967)
("Action by the President within the sphere of his competence ... may operate as a rule
of decision to the same degree as a rule provided by a valid statute or treaty.").
25.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 55-56; see id. at 55 n.262 ("[T]o the extent that
the courts defer to the Executive acting without statutory authority, it is the latter who
claims the right to define the legal rights of American citizens."); see also Ingrid
Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against
the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 920 (2011) (identifying pre-FSIA executive
branch assertions of foreign sovereign immunity as a primary example of the
President's lawmaking power).
26.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 55 ("[In the development of both the foreignsovereign-immunity and act-of-state doctrines, Presidents have in the past asserted the
right to determine when either doctrine is properly invoked in judicial proceedings.");
see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONSTITUTION 54-61 (2d ed.
1996) (identifying suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity as example of presidential
lawmaking but giving no explanation for constitutional authority for such activity).
27.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 56.
28.
See Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004) ('The FSIA
does not, however, address the immunity of foreign heads of states."); United States v.
Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he FSIA addresses neither head-ofstate immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context."). Recently,
the Supreme Court broadly held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not
displace the Executive Branch's role in determining the immunity from civil suit of any
foreign officials. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010).
29.
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Case Note, Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128 (E.D.N.Y 1994), 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 528, 531 (1994) ("Whether courts should be
bound by such 'suggestions' [of head of state immunity] or should even pay much
attention to them is far from clear, although courts certainly seem inclined to do so.");
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: InternationalClaims Settlement by
the President, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 57-58 (2003) (noting suggestions of head of state
immunity as examples of "domestic 'lawmaking' by the President" and suggesting that
analytical focus "should be on the source and scope of executive authority with respect
to domestic courts, particularly in light of the Supremacy Clause, and the ways in
which the Constitution provides for lawmaking"); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1789 (2009)
("[T]he President may not, through his foreign affairs executive power, make new
domestic law. He can make a treaty. He can negotiate an executive agreement
implemented by legislation within Congress's power. But he can no more make law on
his own, through the exercise of the foreign affairs aspect of 'the executive Power,' than
he can legislate on his own.").
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Part II of this Article considers the courts' explanation for the
practice of deferring to executive branch suggestions of immunity. It
focuses on a human rights suit brought against Chinese President
Jiang Zemin in 2002, during a diplomatic visit to the United States.
The suit against President Jiang is one of the more recent and well
publicized instances of the courts' dismissal, at the Executive
Branch's request, of a suit against a foreign head of state. In
dismissing the suit, the district court and court of appeals held that
they were required to follow the Executive Branch's suggestion of
immunity. They explained their holding by pointing to the President's
significant foreign affairs powers and to the harm that would be
caused to our foreign relations were the courts to assume jurisdiction
over suit in which the Executive Branch has recognized the foreign
official's immunity. Part II ends by highlighting the tension between
this explanation for judicial deference to the Executive and the notion
that the President lacks any inherent lawmaking power. That
understanding of Presidential authority is exemplified by the
majority opinion in the Steel Seizure case,30 a suit in which the
Supreme Court repudiated the Executive Branch's reliance on its
general foreign affairs powers as a basis for sole executive
lawmaking.
The third Part argues that the Executive Branch's authority to
direct the dismissal of suits against foreign heads of state derives
from the President's constitutional power to conduct the nation's
diplomacy. The separation-of-powers concerns that explain the courts'
deference to executive branch suggestions of head of state immunity
can be traced back to judicial deference to executive determinations of
foreign state immunity in the 150 years prior to the enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976. Head of state immunity
emerged from the more general doctrine of foreign state immunity
after Congress codified the latter. Understanding the separation-ofpowers concerns informing the courts' deference to executive
suggestions of state immunity thus helps illuminate the
constitutional foundation for the Executive Branch's authority to
determine head of state immunity.
The Article accordingly focuses on the courts' understanding of
the Executive's role at two key periods. Part III first explores the
Supreme Court's initial recognition in 1812 of state sovereign

immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.31 While it is

generally thought that the Supreme Court created foreign sovereign
immunity purely as a "common law" doctrine, a close reading of the
Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity, the government's
arguments, and the Court's decision in The Schooner Exchange show

30.
(1952).
31.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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that the early Court was aware of the relationship between the
recognition of a foreign sovereign's immunity from suit and the
President's constitutional foreign affairs powers. Part III next
explores the courts' increasing reliance on executive branch
suggestions of immunity beginning around the First World War, a
period in which the prevailing international norms were becoming
uncertain, and in which the Executive Branch's understanding of
foreign sovereign immunity diverged from the view adopted by most
U.S. courts. Drawing on these historical considerations, Part III
argues that the courts' deference to executive suggestions of head of
state immunity, and the Executive Branch's concomitant power to
make law, is best explained as a component of the President's
exclusive authority to conduct the nation's diplomacy free from
interference by the other branches. Part III concludes by considering
some objections to the argument: whether it would be simpler to
ground the Executive's power to suggest head of state immunity in
the Reception Clause,3 2 and whether suggestions of immunity really
are examples of executive lawmaking.
Part IV addresses the respective roles of Congress and the courts
in determining the governing principles of head of state immunity.
Congress shares with the President the federal government's
authority over foreign affairs.3 3 Thus, the question arises whether
Congress has concurrent authority to identify principles governing
head of state immunity. Congress's power to. act in an area where the
Constitution gives the Executive Branch specific authority raises
complicated questions that are difficult to answer in the abstract.
However, I propose some general principles shaping the contours of
Congress's power to legislate concerning head of state immunity.
Most fundamentally, while Congress likely does have some authority
to legislate concerning head of state immunity, it could not properly
do so if its action would diminish the Executive Branch's ability to
conduct the nation's diplomacy. Courts similarly cannot act to limit
the President's exercise of a specific constitutional authority. Yet
courts also have the responsibility to determine whether a branch of
government acts in excess of the authority granted by the
Constitution. 34 Accordingly, their principal role is to guard the
separation of powers by upholding executive suggestions of head of
state immunity that are asserted as part of the President's sole
authority to speak for the nation in its relations with foreign states,
while ensuring that the Executive Branch does not improperly
expand its power beyond its constitutional grant.

32.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (giving the President the power to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers).
33.
See infra notes 361-69 and accompanying text.
34.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (describing this inquiry as "a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation").
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I should say a word about the scope of this Article's ambitions. In
the decades before the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, courts routinely deferred to executive branch
determinations of foreign state and foreign official immunity from
suit.35 Some question the propriety of that practice, arguing that it
countenanced unauthorized executive lawmaking. 36 The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act codified the standards governing foreign
state immunity, eliminating judicial deference to executive
determinations, 37 and suggesting to some that the question of
executive authority in this area had become largely a historical
question.3 8 In Samantar v. Yousuf,39 however, the Supreme Court
recently held that the statute did not similarly codify standards
governing the immunity of foreign officials, leaving in place the prior
practice of judicial deference. 40 Some commentators have expressed
concern that Samantar has revitalized the practice of executive
suggestions, raising again the question of expansive executive branch
lawmaking. 41
I will not address those concerns here. In this Article, I seek to
explain the basis for the Executive Branch's authority to determine

35.
See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Chimbne
Keitner reasonably argues that the paucity of suits against foreign officials preceding
the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act makes it difficult to identify
with any certainty a practice of judicial deference to executive branch determinations
of foreign official immunity. Chimine I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 72 (2010). However, there appears to be no record of
any court denying a foreign official immunity from suit in the face of an executive
branch suggestion of immunity. See cases noted in Appendix A, infra for suits involving
head of state immunity, most post-dating the FSIA.
36.
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1709 (1997) ("[Iln contrast to ... delegated executive lawmaking ...
the executive suggestion has no legal basis."); Philip C. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court
Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 169 (1946) (arguing that the
State Department "is not organized in such a way as to facilitate what are essentially
judicial decisions" in cases involving sovereign immunity); Prakash & Ramsey, supra
note 13, at 263 n.125 (finding "troubling" mid-twentieth century judicial deference to
executive branch determinations of foreign state immunity).
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-88 (1983).
37.
See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 4, at 55-56. ("Congress has now enacted
38.
extensive regulation [concerning foreign sovereign immunity] and seems to have
precluded any independent 'regulatory role."').
39.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010).
40.
Id. ("We have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a
problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations
regarding individual official immunity."); see id. at 2284-85 (discussing pre-FSIA
practice of judicial deference).
41.
See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 885 (2011) (raising separation of powers concerns with executive branch
foreign official immunity determinations made in response to pending litigation);
Wuerth, supra note 25 (arguing that the Executive Branch lacks lawmaking power
over most foreign official immunity determinations).
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head of state immunity, not foreign official immunity generally. 4 2
Thus, although the argument presented here may have implications
for the Executive Branch's more general power to determine foreign
official immunity, for the most part, I will not attempt to draw out
those implications. 43 Similarly, while this argument may have
implications for the Executive Branch's authority to suggest the
immunity from suit of foreign officials after they leave office, the
Article will focus on the Executive's power to determine the immunity
of incumbent officials, as the constitutional foundation for the
44
Executive Branch's authority is clearest in that context. While my
focus is narrow, it is informed by the belief that the Executive

42.
Under customary international law, head of state immunity encompasses
the immunity of not only heads of state but also of other "holders of high-ranking office
in a State" such as "the Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs." Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 20-21 (Feb. 14).
The Executive Branch has suggested head of state immunity in suits against highranking foreign officials such as a foreign minister. See cases cited infraAppendix A. I
do intend for the arguments made here to justify the Executive Branch's assertions of
head of state immunity on behalf of these other high-ranking foreign officials. I discuss
the limits of the Executive Branch's authority to determine that a foreign official
qualifies for head of state immunity, and the courts' responsibility to police the
boundaries of the Executive's exercise of that authority, in Part IV.B, infra.
43.
Moreover, I recognize that the Executive's authority to determine foreign
official immunity may derive from different sources, depending on the type of
immunity at issue, and that the scope of the Executive's authority may also vary. See,
e.g., Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2006) (defining the
jurisdictional immunity of individuals entitled to immunity under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]); Keitner, supra note 35, at 71-75 (arguing that the Executive Branch has
constitutional authority to determine the status-based immunity from suit of diplomats
and sitting heads of state, but that courts have ultimate responsibility for determining
conduct-based immunities, with input from the Executive); Wuerth, supra note 25, at
967-75 (arguing that courts should make foreign official immunity determinations as
part of their federal common law power, giving deference to executive branch views on
discrete issues).
In a limited manner, I will pursue the implications of the theory presented here
outside the context of head of state immunity in Part IV.B, infra. There, I will suggest
that courts should defer to the Executive Branch's determinations of special missions
immunity because the Executive's authority to specify the immunity of foreign officials
visiting the United States on official business, like the Executive's authority to
determine head of state immunity, derives from the President's authority to conduct
the nation's diplomacy.
44.
Head of state immunity encompasses the immunity of sitting heads of
state, as well as that of former heads of state who have left office. Under customary
international law, sitting heads of state are generally completely immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts, regardless of the nature of the acts alleged or when they
occurred. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. at 20-21. Former heads of
state have a more limited immunity for acts taken while in office in an official capacity.
See id. at 25; see also David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 194, 196 n.15 (2005) (noting
that under customary international law, sitting "heads of state are absolutely immune"
from suit and "former heads of state are entitled to immunity for their official acts"
taken while in office).
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Branch's authority to suggest the immunity of sitting heads of state
has a constitutional basis that the coordinate branches must respect.
II. THE

TENSION BETWEEN HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
AND EXCLUSIVE CONGRESSIONAL LAWMAKING

Before addressing whether the courts' deference to executive
branch suggestions of head of state immunity is constitutionally
grounded, it will be helpful to consider how courts themselves have
explained the practice. That explanation rests principally on Supreme
Court precedent, prior to the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, in which the Court held that the judiciary must
follow the Executive Branch's suggestion of a foreign state's
immunity from suit. It also relies on general statements about the
Executive's lead role in the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs.
This explanation is less than fully satisfying, however, as it fails to
make clear how the Executive Branch has the constitutional
authority to direct the outcome of private litigation. And it conflicts
with the dominant view-exemplified by the Supreme Court's Steel
Seizure decision 45-that the Executive Branch lacks any inherent
lawmaking power.
A. JudicialDeference to Executive Suggestions of
Head of State Immunity: The Courts'
Explanation
In October 2002, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic
of China visited the United States for a diplomatic meeting with
President George W. Bush. 46 Before meeting with President Bush at
his ranch in Crawford, Texas, President Jiang made stops in a few
U.S. cities, including Chicago. 47 Jiang's itinerary was well publicized
in advance of his visit. 48 Knowing that he would be in town,
practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement brought suit in a

45.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
46.
Kate Hunger, Chinese President, Bush to Meet Today; Crawford Ranch
Talks Will Probably Focus on N. Korea's Nukes, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 25,
2002, at B1. The heads of state discussed matters of significant bilateral concern,
including North Korea's recently acknowledged nuclear arms program. See Press
Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin
Discuss Iraq, N. Korea: Remarks by the President and Chinese President Jiang Zemin
25,
2002),
available at http://georgewbushin Press
Conference
(Oct.
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021025.html.
47.
See R.C. Longworth & Liam Ford, Protesters Greet Jiang in Chicago, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 23, 2002, at 3.
48.
See, e.g., Peter Harmsen, China Predicts "Success" for Jiang's US Visit,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 16, 2002.
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U.S. district court in Chicago against Jiang and the Falun Gong
Control Office, allegedly a component of the Chinese Communist
Party established by Jiang to suppress Falun Gong.49 The complaint
alleged truly horrific human rights abuses, including "arrest without
trial, execution, rape, disappearance, forced labor in work camps, and
torture of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners" for which
defendants were alleged to be responsible.50 The plaintiffs sued under
the Alien Tort Statute,5 ' the Torture Victim Protection Act,5 2 and
section 1985,53 asserting "claims for torture; genocide; violation of the
right to life; violation of the right to liberty and security of the person;
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; violation of the right to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion; and conspiracy to commit
violations of civil rights within the United States."54
Because they knew that Jiang would be heavily guarded and
that it would be difficult to personally serve him with process, the
plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion seeking the district court's leave to
effect service by alternative means.5 5 The district court granted the
motion, permitting the plaintiffs to serve Jiang "by delivering a copy
of the summons and complaint 'to any of the security agents or hotel
staff helping to guard' Jiang during his stay in Chicago." 56 Relying on
that order, the plaintiffs claimed to have delivered the process to a
Chicago police commander stationed at Jiang's hotel and to U.S.
Secret Service agents detailed to guard Jiang.5 7
When Jiang and the Control Office failed to respond to the
complaint, the plaintiffs sought a default order.5 8 The Executive
Branch appeared in the litigation, however, to urge dismissal of the

Plaintiff A v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
49.
aff'd sub nom. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004). Some plaintiffs and
their family members remained residents of China. Id. at 877 n.1. Accordingly, they
brought the suit under pseudonyms to avoid possible reprisal. Id. Other plaintiffs,
residents of the United States, sued under their proper names. Id. at 877.
50.
Id. at 878.
51.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."). After the district court ruled in Jiang
Zemin, the Supreme Court held that district courts have authority under the Alien
Tort Statute to recognize a limited number of common law rights of action for certain
torts in violation of the law of nations. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-31
(2004).
52.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); see id. § 2 (establishing a right of
action for torture and extrajudicial killing).
53.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (creating a private right of action for damages
for conspiracy to violate civil rights).
54.
JiangZemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 877-78.
55.
Id. at 879.
56.
Id. (quoting Order of October 21, 2002).
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 878.
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suit.59 The State Department Legal Adviser sent a letter concerning
the suit to the Assistant Attorney General of the Department of
Justice's Civil Division.6 0 The letter explained that "President Jiang
is the sitting head of state of the People's Republic of China" and that
the Chinese government had formally asked the State Department to
"take all steps necessary to have this action against President Jiang
dismissed."6 1 The letter advised that "[t]he Department of State
recognizes and allows the immunity of President Jiang from this
suit."62 It explained that "[u]nder customary rules of international
law, recognized and applied in the United States, President Jiang is
immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts in this
case."63 The letter also noted "the particular importance attached by
the United States to obtaining the prompt dismissal of the
proceedings against President Jiang in view of the significant foreign
policy implications of such an action against the President of a
friendly foreign State."64
On the basis of the State Department's letter, the government
argued that the district court was "bound by the Executive Branch's
determinations of immunity" and was compelled to dismiss the suit.65
The government cited no statute authorizing the State Department to
terminate private litigation against a foreign official. Nevertheless,
the district court found "the government's suggestion of immunity
dispositive" and dismissed the action against Jiang. 66 The plaintiffs

59.
Id.
Letter from William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to
60.
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Dec. 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Taft Letter], reprinted in United States Suggestion of Immunity, supra
note 15, app. Tab E. The Taft Letter is reproduced in Appendix B of this Article, infra.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. The immunity from suit of sitting heads of state has long been
recognized in customary international law. See SATOW's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC
PRACTICE 9 (Lord Gore-Booth ed., 5th ed. 1979) ("It has been established for several
centuries in customary international law that a sovereign, or head of state, who comes
within the territory of another sovereign is entitled to wide privileges and to
ceremonial honours appropriate to his position and dignity, and to full immunity from
the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the state which he is visiting."
(footnote omitted)). Customary international law is uncodified and "results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 102(2) (1987). It is distinguished from positive international law, such as
treaties and other agreements. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 702 (1900)
(making the distinction).
Taft Letter, infra Appendix B.
64.
Plaintiff A v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The
65.
United States also argued that the alternative service order should be vacated because
the district court lacked authority, absent statutory authorization, to direct executive
branch security personnel to effect service of process on a visiting head of state they are
assigned to protect. United States Suggestion of Immunity, supranote 15, at 4-11.
Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 882, 889. The district court rejected the
66.
government's argument that, because Jiang enjoyed head of state immunity, the
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appealed, and the Executive Branch again participated in the
litigation to assert Jiang's immunity from suit.6 7 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that courts are
required to accept the Executive Branch's head of state immunity
determinations. 68 However, the district court and the Seventh Circuit
did not explain in any great detail why they believed courts are
required to defer to the Executive Branch's determination that a
foreign head of state is immune from civil suit in the United States. 69
Both courts noted a long history of deference to the executive branch
determinations of foreign sovereign immunity and the absence of a
statute controlling the immunity of foreign officials.7 0 And they

plaintiffs could not use him as an involuntary agent for service on the Falun Gong
Control Office. Id. at 884. However, the district court dismissed the claims against the
Control Office because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the Control Office had
sufficient contacts with the forum state to permit the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over it. Id. at 886-89. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the entire
suit. Id. at 889-90.
67.
The government's brief to the Seventh Circuit expressed "great[] concern"
about the serious charges in the plaintiffs' complaint, and it noted that the State
Department "has on various occasions documented and strongly condemned the
systematic persecution by the Chinese Government of the followers of Falun Gong."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 3, Wei Ye v.
Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-3989) (citing State Department
reports on human rights practices and on religious freedom). Nevertheless, the
government explained, it appeared to "defend the district court's holding that it was
bound to accept the Executive Branch's assertion of President Jiang's immunity from
suit." Id. at 4.
68.
Wei Ye, 383 F.3d at 626 ("The obligation of the judicial branch is clear-a
determination by the Executive Branch that a foreign head of state is immune from
suit is conclusive and a court must accept such a determination without reference to
the underlying claims of a plaintiff."). The Seventh Circuit also accepted the
government's argument that the Executive Branch's determination of Jiang's head of
state immunity precludes the plaintiffs' use of Jiang as an involuntary service agent.
Id. at 627-28. Accordingly, it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit against
the Control Office, although on different grounds than those accepted by the district
court. Id. at 630.
69.
In holding that executive branch head of state immunity determinations
are controlling, the district court and the Seventh Circuit joined the near-uniform view
of the few courts to have considered the issue. See cases cited infra Appendix A.
70.
Wei Ye, 383 F.3d at 624-25; Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 879-82. When
the district court and the Seventh Circuit issued their decisions, the majority of circuit
courts had held that the immunity from suit of foreign officials is controlled by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811,
815 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a suit against an individual official for acts committed
in an official capacity is governed by the FSIA); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Indus.
de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank,
912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). In Wei Ye, the Seventh Circuit joined the
Eleventh in holding that the FSIA did not displace the Executive Branch's authority to
determine the immunity of foreign heads of state. See United States v. Noriega, 117
F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he FSIA addresses neither head-of-state
immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the criminal context. . . .").
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit extended its holding in Wei Ye to foreign officials
generally, creating a clear circuit split. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82
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suggested that deference is grounded in the Constitution's separation
of powers and the Executive Branch's lead role in foreign affairs. 7'
In grounding their deference to the Executive Branch this way,
the Seventh Circuit and the district court followed earlier Supreme
Court practice. The principles governing a foreign state's immunity
from suit are now codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.72
But before Congress enacted that statute in 1976, courts determined
a foreign state's amenability to suit by looking to principles
articulated by the Executive Branch.73 The Supreme Court's
explanation for this practice-when it gave one-was typically
laconic. The Court would note that U.S. courts' exercise of jurisdiction
in a suit against a foreign state could be taken as a
"serious ... challenge to [the foreign state's] dignity, and may so
affect our friendly relations with it."74 After making this factual
prediction, the Court would state the constitutional-sounding
imperative "that the courts should not so act as to embarrass the
executive arm in the conduct of its foreign affairs."17 And it would
then assert the legal rule "that courts are required to accept and
follow the executive determination [s]1"76 of immunity and to
"surrender [their] jurisdiction in such cases."77 Thus, the Supreme

(7th Cir. 2005) ("If Congress meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity
in the scope of the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms."). The
split deepened when the Second Circuit adopted the majority view and the Fourth
Circuit joined the Seventh in holding that the FSIA does not apply to foreign
government officials. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 379-81 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd,
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001,
538 F.3d 71, 80-85 (2d Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split when it
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding in the Samantar case. See Samantar, 130 S. Ct.
at 2291 ("We have been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or
wanted to eliminate, the State Department's role in determinations regarding
individual official immunity.").
71.
Wei Ye, 383 F.3d at 626-27 ("'Separation-of-powers principles impel a
reluctance in the judiciary to interfere with or embarrass the executive in its
constitutional role as the nation's primary organ of international policy."' (quoting
Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974))); Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d at
880 ('[T]he courts should not so act as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of
foreign affairs."' (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945))).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611
72.
(2006 & Supp. II 2008).
73.
See, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 ("It is ... not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.").
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); see Hoffman, 324 U.S.
74.
at 35 ("Every judicial action exercising or relinquishing jurisdiction ... has its effect
upon our relations with that government.").
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35; see Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588.
75.
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588.
76.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35. The Court described this requirement of deference
77.
as a "rule of substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts." Id.
at 36.
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Court has grounded the deference rule on the Executive Branch's
general foreign affairs powers3 8
B. The Uneasy Coexistence of Suggestions of Immunity
and the "Steel Seizure" Presidency
But the Supreme Court's explanation creates a conundrum.
When the Executive Branch establishes principles of foreign
sovereign immunity governing the courts' exercise of jurisdiction, it
makes law affecting the private rights of litigants. No statute
authorizes the Executive Branch to determine the immunity of
foreign states and officials. What then is the source of this authority?
The Supreme Court at times has said that the Executive Branch
has no independent lawmaking power; that, under our Constitution,
any law that the Executive creates must be pursuant to a delegation
of lawmaking authority from Congress. Thus, in Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital, the Supreme Court declared it "axiomatic that
an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."7 9 It
might be uncontroversial to say that executive agencies-which are,
after all, created by Congress-have no independent lawmaking
authority. But the Court has said more generally that "rulemaking
power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive
function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive
Branch."8 0
Lest there be any doubt, the Supreme Court in the Steel Seizure
case 8 ' said that the President, the embodiment of the executive
power,82 lacks any independent lawmaking authority. In that case,
the Supreme Court invalidated President Truman's attempt to take
control of the nation's steel mills. 83 The President had ordered the
seizure in response to a labor dispute he believed would hinder steel
production, which could, in turn, impair the United States' military
operations in the Korean conflict. 84 In support of his order, the
President cited both the need to protect national security interests

78.
See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 56 ("In the immunity cases, the Supreme
Court did not say (or intimate) that issues of immunity are unique, or that the
Executive had special powers in regard to them; to support its doctrine the Court
invoked only general Executive powers in foreign affairs.").
79.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
80.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989).
81.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
82.
See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").
83.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 589.
84.
See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 C.F.R. 3139 (1952), reprinted in Steel
Seizure, 343 U.S. at 589-92 app. ("Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take
Possession of and Operate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companies.").
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and the United States' foreign policy decision to work through the
United Nations to end the conflict.85 The government defended the
President's action as authorized by "the aggregate of [the President's]
constitutional powers as the nation's Chief Executive and the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States."86 But
despite the obvious implications for national security and foreign
relations, the Supreme Court held that the President had acted
beyond his authority.
The Court observed that the President's power to seize the steel
mills must derive either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution.8 7 No statute authorized the seizure. Indeed, Congress
previously had rejected an amendment to the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 that would have permitted government seizure
during times of national emergency.8 8 Thus, the seizure was justified
by the President's constitutional authority or not at all.89 The Court
tersely dismissed the government's contention that the seizure was a
proper exercise of the President's military power as Commander in
Chief.90 The Court found equally unpersuasive the government's
argument that the seizure was justified by the Constitution's grant of
executive powers to the President:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal
91
about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.

85.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 589-90.
86.
Id. at 582.
87.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). That the
88.
President was acting against the apparent will of Congress is what led Justice Jackson
to propose in his celebrated concurring opinion the tripartite scheme for analyzing the
validity of presidential acts. See id. at 634-638 (Jackson, J., concurring) (proposing
that presidential power is: "at its maximum" when the President acts pursuant to
congressional authorization because the action is supported by the inherent
constitutional authority of both branches; exercised in a "zone of twilight" when the
President acts in the absence of congressional direction and where constitutional
distribution of authority is uncertain or concurrent between the two political branches;
"at its lowest ebb" when the President acts contrary to Congress's will and will be
sustained only when the President but not Congress has constitutional authority to
act).
89.
Id. at 598.
90.
Id. at 587 ("[T]ak[ing] possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production [is] a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its
military authorities.").
91.
Id. at 587; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (giving the President the power
to veto bills presented by Congress); id. art. II, § 3 (authorizing the President to
recommend legislation to Congress). The Supreme Court has relied on this passage
from Steel Seizure when reiterating the view that the President lacks any inherent
lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526-27 (2008); INS v.
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While the Court found it "beyond question" that Congress could have
enacted the seizure order the President issued, it concluded that
"[t]he Constitution did not subject this law-making power of Congress
to presidential or military supervision or control." 92
It is, therefore, far from obvious that the Executive Branch's
general foreign affairs powers authorize the Executive to interfere
with private rights, as happens when, at the Executive Branch's
direction, U.S. courts dismiss suits against foreign heads of state. The
courts' deference to executive branch determinations of head of state
immunity do not sit well with the idea exemplified by the Steel
Seizure decision that the Executive Branch is completely subservient
to Congress in lawmaking. In the next Part, I will show that the
practice of judicial deference to executive branch suggestions of head
of state immunity can be explained as an exercise of the President's
lawmaking authority, a power implied from a specific constitutional
power vested in the Executive Branch, the power to control the
nation's diplomacy with foreign states. The conception of the
Executive as a fully subservient lawmaker must therefore be revised.
III. THE EXECUTIVE AS LAWMAKER: IMMUNITY AND DIPLOMACY
Head of state immunity has its roots in the broader doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. As a matter of U.S. law, head of state
immunity emerged as a distinct doctrine only after Congress enacted
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.9 3 Thus, in considering
whether the Constitution gives the President authority to suggest the
immunity of sitting heads of state, thereby interfering with the
private rights of litigants, it will be helpful first to consider the
emergence of head of state immunity from the broader doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity.

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 527-28 ("As
Madison explained in The Federalist No. 47, under our constitutional system of checks
and balances, '[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of
himself make a law."').
92.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587.
93.
See Dellapenna, supra note 29, at 529 ("There was no precedent for a
doctrine of substantive immunity for foreign heads of state (as distinct from the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity generally) until after the enactment of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976."); Peter Even Bass, Note, Ex-Head of State
Immunity: A Proposed Statutory Tool for Foreign Policy, 97 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1987)
("Since the enactment of the FSIA, immunity for foreign states as entities and
immunity for heads of state as individuals have been decided through different
procedures and at the initiative of different branches of government."); Jerrold L.
Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1986) ("[Dlespite their common origin,
head-of-state immunity and [foreign] sovereign immunity have evolved into separate
legal constructs.").
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Foreign sovereign immunity from suit has long been recognized
in U.S. law. The Supreme Court first announced the doctrine in its
1812 decision, The Schooner Exchange.94 It is generally thought that
the Supreme Court created foreign sovereign immunity as a "common
law" doctrine, and that the courts' deference to executive branch
suggestions of immunity is a twentieth-century development.9 But a
close reading of The Schooner Exchange decision and the
government's submissions in that case show the early Court's
awareness of a connection between foreign sovereign immunity and
the President's constitutional foreign affairs powers. After The
Schooner Exchange, in suits against foreign states or their property,
courts routinely applied principles of foreign sovereign immunity. In
many of these cases, the Executive Branch suggested the immunity of
the foreign sovereign. Courts increasingly relied on executive branch
suggestions of immunity beginning around the First World War, a
period in which the prevailing international norms were becoming
uncertain, and in which the Executive Branch's understanding of
foreign sovereign immunity diverged from the view adopted by most
U.S. courts. By the mid-1940s, that reliance became a rule of absolute
deference.
We have seen that the courts' appeal to the President's general
foreign affairs powers does not provide a satisfying explanation for
this practice. After laying out the historical development of judicial
deference to executive branch suggestions of foreign state immunity, I
hope to show that the courts' deference to executive branch
suggestions of head of state immunity can be explained as flowing
from the President's exclusive authority to represent the United
States in its diplomatic dealings with foreign nations. I will then
consider two objections to the theory proposed here: that head of state
immunity can be grounded on the President's constitutional power to
receive foreign ambassadors, providing a simpler justification, and
that determinations of head of state immunity do not constitute
lawmaking.

94.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
95.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa,
Customary InternationalLaw, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV.
869, 922 (2007) ("For most of our nation's history, head-of-state immunity was viewed
as a component of foreign sovereign immunity. Prior to Erie, and consistent with the
view that [customary international law] was treated as nonfederal general common
law, federal and state courts alike applied the [customary international law] of foreign
sovereign immunity on the domestic plane without authorization from Congress or the
Executive.").
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A. The Emergence of Head of State Immunity and
Deference to Executive Suggestions

The Supreme Court's opinion in The Schooner Exchange9 6 is the
fountainhead of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in U.S.
law, and it established the practice of executive branch suggestions of
immunity. 9 7 The Exchange was an in rem admiralty action seeking
possession of a schooner located in the port of Philadelphia.9 8 The
libellants" claimed that they were the sole owners of the schooner
but that, while it was sailing to Spain, the ship had been forcibly
taken by persons "acting under the decrees and orders of
NAPOLEON,

Emperor of the French."00 The libellants further

alleged that the schooner's name had been changed to the Balaou and
that the ship had entered the port of Philadelphia for repairs, having
"encountered great stress of weather upon the high seas."10 ' While in
port, the ship "was seized, arrested, and detained in pursuant of the
process of attachment issued upon the prayer of the libellants."102
After no one responded to oppose the libellants' claim, the court twice
issued orders directing any person to show cause why the vessel
should not be turned over to the former owners.1 03 Subsequently,
Alexander Dallas, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania,
filed a suggestion of immunity, "at the instance of the executive
department of the government of the United States."104 The
government's suggestion asserted:
That in as much as there exists between the United States of America
and Napoleon, emperor of France and king of Italy, &c. &c. a state of
peace and amity; the public vessel of his said Imperial and Royal
Majesty, conforming to the law of nations, and laws of the said United
States, may freely enter the ports and harbors of the said United

96.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. The United States Reports
contain not only the decision of the Court, but also the reporter's commentary of the
case, the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity, and the arguments of the parties.
97.
On direction from the President, a U.S. Attorney had previously suggested
the immunity of a foreign sovereign vessel from the U.S. courts' admiralty jurisdiction
in Ketland v. The Cassius, 14 F. Cas. 431, 432 (C.C.D. Pa. 1796) (No. 7,743). However,
the suit was dismissed on alternative jurisdictional grounds. Id.
98.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117 (reporter's commentary).
99.
In admiralty suits, the plaintiff is called the "libellant" (or "libelant"), and
the complaint is called a "libel." See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654,
659 (1996) ('The libelant [plaintiff] shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel [complaint]
on the United States attorney for [the] district [where suit is brought] and mail a copy
thereof by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States."' (quoting
Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156, § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 30906 (2006))) (alterations in original)).
100.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117 (reporter's commentary).
101.
Id. at 118 (executive branch suggestion of immunity).
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 117 (reporter's commentary).
104.
Id. at 118 (reporter's commentary).
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States, and at pleasure depart therefrom without seizure, arrest,
105
detention or molestation.

The suggestion denied that the vessel had been forcibly taken from
the libellants, but asserted that, even if it had been, the ship had
become "vested in his Imperial and Royal Majesty . .. according to the
decrees and laws of France." 06 Because the schooner was a public
vessel of a friendly foreign sovereign, the suggestion urged the court
to quash the attachment and dismiss the libel.1 07 The district court
dismissed the libel on that ground.108 After the libellants appealed
and the circuit court reversed, the United States appealed to the
Supreme Court.109
In the Supreme Court, the United States was represented both
by Dallas and William Pinkney, the U.S. Attorney General. Their
argument intermingled three principal themes. First, they argued
that, under the law of nations, a foreign sovereign is immune from
suits by the citizens of another sovereign."10 This immunity stems
from the presumption that a foreign sovereign generally does not
"consent to submit to the ordinary judicial tribunals of the
country,"" or, alternatively, from "the assent of the other Sovereign"
in whose territory the foreign sovereign appears. 1 2 Thus, "[w]hen an
individual receives an injury from a foreign sovereign, he must
complain to his own government, who will make it a matter of
negotiation, and if justice be refused may grant reprisal."" 3 Second,
Id. (executive branch suggestion of immunity).
105.
106.
Id. at 119 (executive branch suggestion of immunity).
Id.
107.
Id. at 119-20 (reporter's commentary).
108.
Id. at 120 (reporter's commentary). At the time, the Supreme Court sat as a
109.
court of appeals over judgments from the circuit courts in admiralty and maritime
suits. Act of Mar. 3, 1808, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244, 244.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 123 (argument of Dallas)
110.
(when a sovereign is sued "in his sovereign character ... no consent to submit to the
ordinary judicial tribunals of the country can be implied"); id. at 132 (argument of
Pinkney) ("We are asked, whence we infer the immunity of the public armed vessel of a
sovereign. We answer from the nature of sovereignty, and from the universal practice
of nations from the time of Tyre and Sidon."). Tyre and Sidon are biblical cities. See,

e.g., Jeremiah 25:22.
111.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 123 (argument of Dallas).
112.
Id. at 147 (argument of Pinkney).
113.
Id. at 123 (argument of Dallas); see id. at 133 (argument of Pinkney) ("The
remedy is by opposing Sovereign to Sovereign, not by subjecting him to the ordinary
jurisdiction."). This is a version of the idea of "diplomatic protection." See Rep. of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10,
at 16, GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) (Article I of Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection) ("[D]iplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, through
diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another
State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural
or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation
of such responsibility."). "Reprisal" is a sovereign's authorization to take foreign
property to redress a wrong to a citizen or subject. Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures
Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1736-37 (2009). The Constitution assigns to Congress
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Dallas contended that a nation has the right "to change the public
law as to foreign nations, upon giving notice."1 14 But nothing in our
domestic law changed the law-of-nations baseline: "Our acts of
Congress never subject foreign public vessels to forfeiture," and no
"practical construction" of U.S. law "by the executive, the legislative,
or the judicial department of our government .. . authorizes the
jurisdiction now claimed." 1 5
Third, Dallas and Pinkney argued that the courts would exceed
their authority if they were to adjudicate the libellants' claims. The
exercise of jurisdiction in this case would "amount to a judicial
declaration of war," Dallas argued. 116 Dallas analogized the case
before the Court to another on its docket in which the Court was
asked to determine whether a former colony of France had become
independent, and another asking the Court to adjudicate who is the
proper sovereign of Spain.117 He urged the Court to refrain from
adjudicating cases "of this nature," as exercising jurisdiction over
such cases would "absorb all the functions of government, and leave
nothing for the legislative or executive departments to perform."" 8

the authority to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," and to "grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. A letter of marque and
reprisal authorizes a private citizen to engage in capture-private conduct that, when
engaged in on the high seas, would constitute piracy without such authorization.
Wuerth, supra, at 1735-39; see also Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113
(outlawing piracy).
114.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 123 (argument of Dallas).
115.
Id. at 125 (argument of Dallas). Dallas pointed out that the NonIntercourse Act authorized judicial forfeiture of private vessels violating an embargo
against the importation of British goods but only authorized interdiction of British
public vessels. Id. at 123; see Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 24, §§ 3, 6, 2 Stat. 528, 529-30
(1809). The Non-Intercourse Act imposed an embargo on both British and French
goods, but the embargo had been lifted against France by the end of 1810. See Act of
May 1, 1810, ch. 39, § 4, 2 Stat. 605 (replacing the Non-Intercourse Act and providing
that trade restrictions would cease upon determination by President that Great Britain
or France had ceased its offending trade practices); James Madison, Proclamation as
President of the United States (Nov. 2, 1810), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 481-82 (James D. Richardson, ed. 1896)
(declaring that France had so ceased).
116.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 126 (argument of Dallas).
117.
Id. (argument of Dallas). It is unclear which cases Dallas had in mind. The
Spanish case may have involved an appeal from the circuit court's interlocutory
decision in King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577, 579 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 7814)
(declining to decide on motion whether Ferdinand VII could maintain suit in the name
of the King of Spain before being recognized as such by the government of the United
States). But there appears to be no reported Supreme Court decision in that case. As
for the other case to which Dallas referred, the Court frequently faced the question of
the sovereign status of foreign territory. See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839) ("To what sovereignty any island or country belongs, is a
question which often arises before Courts in the exercise of a maritime jurisdiction; and
also in actions on policies of insurance.").
118.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 126 (argument of Dallas).
Six years after The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court heeded Dallas' caution in
holding that courts must follow the political branches in recognizing foreign
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Pinkney similarly argued that, "[h]owever unjust a confiscation may
be, a judicial condemnation closes the judicial eye upon its enormity.
The right to demand redress belongs to the executive department,
which alone represents the sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse
with other nations."1 19 Dallas and Pinkney thus strongly suggested
that dismissal of the suit was required by the constitutional
separation of powers.
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and upheld the
district court's dismissal of the suit. 120 In an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court adopted each of the three themes urged by the
government.
1.

The Law of Nations

The Court agreed with Dallas and Pinkney that the law of
nations provides the starting point for its evaluation of the propriety
of the suit against a foreign sovereign's vessel. Finding "few, if any,
aids from precedents or written law," the Court reasoned from
"general principles" concerning the nature of sovereignty and by
analogy to other circumstances in which sovereigns enjoy
immunity.1 2 ' Dallas argued that a foreign sovereign's immunity is

governments. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35 (1818). The
Court later clarified that the Constitution vests only in the Executive Branch the
authority to recognize foreign governments and, for purposes of U.S. law, to resolve
disputes about sovereignty over foreign territory. See, e.g., Williams, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
at 420 (when the President, "in the exercise of his constitutional functions" has decided
"a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country" the determination is
"conclusive on the judicial department"); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 44
(1849) ("In the case of foreign nations, the government acknowledged by the President
is always recognized in the courts of justice.").
Dallas may have believed that the Chief Justice would be particularly receptive to
an argument based on the idea that judicial overreaching would undermine the proper
function of the political branches. In his well-known speech before the House of
Representatives, then-Congressman John Marshall argued that U.S. courts could
resolve only disputes presented by parties and could not give advisory opinions. Were it
otherwise, "[tihe division of power ... could exist no longer, and the other departments
would be swallowed up by the Judiciary." John Marshall, Address before the House of
Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 606 (1800) [hereinafter
Marshall Speech]. In this speech, Marshall gave a defense for an expansive conception
of the powers of the Presidency, from which he would later retreat as Chief Justice. See
Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J.
229, 338-53, 362-64 (1990). Nevertheless, even if the Chief Justice would view The
Schooner Exchange as presenting what would normally be a justiciable controversy,
involving a claimed violation of individual rights, giving the injured party "a right to
resort to the law of his country for a remedy," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 166 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.), he might still be open to the argument that the law of
the country requires the judiciary to refrain from adjudicating a claim against a foreign
sovereign, requiring the injured party to seek redress from the Executive Branch.
119.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 132.
120.
Id. at 147.
121.
Id. at 136.
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premised on the assumption that the foreign sovereign had not
consented to suit in our courts. 122 But the Supreme Court instead
adopted a foundational premise Pinkney suggested:' 23
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. .. . All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of
12 4
the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.

Sovereigns have found it mutually beneficial to have relations with
other sovereigns. And to aid the "interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require," sovereigns have
generally agreed to "a relaxation . . . of that absolute and complete

25
jurisdiction within their respective territories."1
Thus, it is "universally understood" that a foreign sovereign
invited into the territory of another is free "from arrest or
detention." 126 Similarly, "all civilized nations allow [the immunity of]
foreign ministers."127 The immunity of foreign ministers follows from
considerations of mutual self-interest; without them, "every sovereign
would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister
abroad."' 28 Likewise, a sovereign who permits another sovereign's
troops to pass through its territory is understood to waive jurisdiction
over the army, because exercising such jurisdiction would divert "a

portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation .

.

. from

29
those national objects and duties to which it was applicable."1 In the
Court's view, a foreign sovereign's military vessels are much like a
foreign sovereign's army, with one important difference. Passage of
troops through one's territory "will probably be at all times
inconvenient and injurious."1 30 For this reason, permission to pass
must always be explicit. 13' But permitting foreign sovereign warships
to dock does not pose the same inconvenience. 132 Thus, permission
may be inferred. 3 3 From these considerations, the Court deduced "a
principle of public law that national ships of war, entering the port of
a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as
34
exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction."1

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 123 (argument of Dallas).
Id. at 133 (argument of Pinkney).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id; see also id. at 133-34 (argument of Pinkney) (making this argument).
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 145-46.
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The Court gave no explanation for why law of nations principles
were relevant to the suit.13 5 The omission might strike some modern
readers as curious, given the current debate about the role of
international law in U.S. courts.1 36 However, in early American
jurisprudence, the law of nations was part of the "common" or
"general" law' 3 7 and "was not attached to any particular

135.
Although the term "law of nations" does not appear in the Court's decision,
there is little doubt that the "principle of public law" the Court announced was a
principle of the law of nations. The parties' arguments were expressly framed in terms
of the law of nations. Id. at 122-35 (argument of the parties). In discussing the scope of
the immunity principles that the Court considers, the Court's opinion cites Vattel and
Bynkershoek-preeminent continental authorities on the law of nations. Id. at 143,
144-45; see Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 823 (1989) (noting that Vattel was the treatise writer on the law of
nations most often consulted by eighteenth-century American lawyers). Furthermore,
the decision's appeal to "general principles," "a train of reasoning" based on
considerations of the attributes of sovereignty, and "the unanimous consent of nations"
eliminate any doubt that the Court was looking to the law of nations to determine the
propriety of adjudicating the suit. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136,
144. The early Supreme Court understood the law of nations to be composed of norms
derived from natural law and state practice. See William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law, Congress and the Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in
MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAw WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
DETLEV VAGTS 531, 536-44 (P. Bekker et al. eds., 2010); see also RAMSEY, supra note
13, at 344 ("The eighteenth-century view [of the law of nations] was ... openly based
on natural law identified by reason. . . . Much of the idea, at least, was that principles
of international relations could be discovered through reason, from the nature and
needs of the international system.").
136.
Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARv. L. REV. 815, 857 (1997) (arguing that the rejection in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), of federal general common law places limits on the courts'
constitutional authority to apply customary international law as federal common law
absent permission from the political branches), and Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore,
supra note 95, at 885-86 (same), with Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 595, 596-99 (2008) (contesting claim that Erie limits federal courts' authority
to apply customary international law norms in adjudicating suits), and Harold Hongju
Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2398-2402 (1991)
(broadly defending adjudication of suits claiming violations of customary international
law norms), and Carlos M. VAizquez, Customary InternationalLaw as U.S. Law: A
Critique of the Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 495 (2011) (arguing that customary international law generally is
preemptive federal law enforceable in courts, usually as a defense or as informing
statutory interpretation).
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
137.
JudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1513, 1515
& n.9 (1984); id. at 1524 (including the law of nations within the general law); see The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122-23 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.) (equating "law of
nations" with the "general law"); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161
(1820) (Story, J.) ("[T]he law of nations ... is part of the common law."); see also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-32 (2004) (suggesting that early American
jurisprudence conceived of the law of nations as part of the general common law); id. at
739 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The law of nations that would have been
applied [in the late eighteenth century] in this federal forum was at the time part of
the so-called general common law."). Law deriving from the judicial decisions of state
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sovereign."13 8 Rather, "it existed by common practice and consent
1 40
among a number of sovereigns"' 39 or was deduced through reason.
A foreign sovereign's immunity from suit comes within the central
subjects of the doctrine,141 and until the Supreme Court's Erie
decision,14 2 courts of the United States routinely applied the general
law in cases to which it applied.143
2.

Subject to Revision

Although The Schooner Exchange recognized the immunity from
suit of a foreign sovereign's public vessel as a principle of the law of
nations, the Court nevertheless recognized that the rule is subject to
revision. 144 "Without a doubt," the Court said, "the sovereign of the
place is capable of destroying this implication" that foreign sovereign
war vessels are immune from suit.145 The sovereign may "exercise
jurisdiction" over the ships "either by employing force, or by
subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals."146 But in light of
the interests at stake, the Court would not construe a general
statutory grant of "ordinary jurisdiction" as providing authority for
adjudicating claims "in a case, in which the sovereign power has
impliedly consented to wa[i]ve its jurisdiction."147 Instead, the Court
would consider such ships to be immune until "such power be exerted
in a manner not to be misunderstood."148 Until then, "the sovereign

courts and based in domestic legal principles, which we today call "common law," was
in early America considered to be part of 'local" state law. Fletcher, supra, at 1514,
1527.
138.
Fletcher, supranote 137, at 1517.
139.
Id. Modern customary international law, which is also based on the practice
of sovereigns, grew out of the law of nations. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 136, at
822; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 102(2) (1987) (describing "customary international law" as "result[ing] from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation").
140.
Stewart Jay, Originsof Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1231, 1270 (1985).
141.
See Jay, supra note 135, at 822-23 (explaining that eighteenth-century law
of nations generally "comprised the law merchant, maritime law, and the law of
conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing the relations between states").
142.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (holding that federal courts hearing cases under
diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law instead of "federal general
common law").
See generally Fletcher, supra note 137, at 1517-27 (discussing general
143.
common law as the rule of decision in the federal courts).
Under classic formulations of the law of nations, a sovereign's immunity
144.
from suit in the courts of another sovereign fell within a category of mandatory
principles from which derogation was not permitted. Dodge, supra note 135, at 543.
William Dodge argues that The Schooner Exchange shifted foreign sovereign immunity
to the category of principles based on custom and consent. Id. at 543-44.
145.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
148.
Id.
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cannot be considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a
jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith to exercise." 149
3.

By "the Sovereign"

The Schooner Exchange thus identified a background ruleforeign sovereign vessels are absolutely immune from suit in U.S.
courts-that is subject to revision. But revision by whom? The Court's
explanation that "the sovereign" may revise the applicable immunity
rule is not particularly illuminating, since the federal government
generally embodies the sovereignty of the United States. 150
Nevertheless, the opinion suggests a more specific answer. As a
general matter, the early Supreme Court showed no hesitation in
identifying and applying the law-of-nations principles governing a
case.' 51 But by refusing to construe the general statutory grants of
jurisdiction as authority to adjudicate the libellants' claims, The
Schooner Exchange suggests that courts could not exercise their
portion of the nation's sovereignty to alter law-of-nations rules
through judge-made law.152 The converse implication is that Congress
could enact a law specifically to provide for jurisdiction over suits
involving foreign sovereign ships.' 5 3 Such a statute would be within
Congress's constitutional power to establish inferior courts, 15 4 and

149.
Id.
See, e.g., Conro v. Crane (The Legal Tender Cases), 110 U.S. 410, 438
150.
(1884) ("The people of the United States by the constitution established a national
government, with sovereign powers, legislative, executive, and judicial.").
151.
See, e.g., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 193
(1815) (applying the law of nations to a controversy arising out of a wartime capture of
a vessel).
See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146 (explaining that the
152.
Court would not construe an ordinary grant of jurisdiction to authorize the suit
because, among other reasons, "the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to
avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign"). There appears to be no suggestion that
early U.S. courts saw a role for themselves in developing the law of nations, in the way
that a modern state common law court develops the common law. See Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J., concurring) ("When the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement.").
153.
See G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The
Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 729 (1989) ('The principles of the law of nations
that Marshall Court Justices invoked in their international law opinions were thus
perceived as versions of natural law. But there were conflicts between domestic laws
and those principles, and at times the Justices of the Marshall Court assumed that a
nation might not abide by those principles if they conflicted with its self-interest. Even
if the principles of the law of nations were simply embodiments of natural law, the
Justices believed, natural law might yield to the positive enactments of sovereign
nations.").
154.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 1.
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perhaps within its power to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations. 15 5
The Court appears to have contemplated another possibility: in
the absence of a statute regulating foreign sovereign immunity, the
Executive Branch could inform the courts of the immunity principles
the United States recognizes in a particular suit against a foreign
sovereign. After announcing the background immunity rule and
recognizing that the rule could be changed by the sovereign, the
156
Because The
Court applied "[t]he principles . . . to the case at bar."
Schooner Exchange was a public armed ship of a friendly foreign
sovereign, under the applicable background law-of-nations principle,
the vessel "must be considered as having come into the American
territory under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it,
and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt
57
No statute changed the
from the jurisdiction of the country."'
background rule. If the United States could derogate from the law of
nations only through an act of Congress, the Court's decision could
have ended here. But the Court added that, "[i]f this opinion be
correct, there seems to be a necessity for admitting that the fact
might be disclosed to the Court by the suggestion of the Attorney for
the United States."15 8
59
I grant that this last statement is far from pellucid.1 But it
suggests that the Court was willing to accept the Executive Branch's
assertion that the "implied promise" remains intact and that the
United States has not rescinded the foreign sovereign's immunity
from suit. This interpretation is consistent with the separation-ofpowers arguments the government made to the Court, and, in

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in
155.
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611 (identifying, among others, the Inferior Tribunal
Clauses and Define and Punish Clause as authority for enactment of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act). But see infra note 375 (suggesting that it is not apparent
that, as a matter of original intent, the Define and Punish Clause gives Congress
authority to implement legislation diverging from the prevailing law of nations).
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
156.
Id. at 147.
157.
Id.
158.
In particular, "it is not at all clear whether [the Court] is referring to the
159.
'fact' of ownership or the legal question of immunity, or both." John Norton Moore, The
Role of the State Department in Judicial Proceedings, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 286
(1962) (discussing The Schooner Exchange). It could be that the "fact" the Executive
Branch might disclose is the fact that the vessel at issue belongs to the foreign
sovereign. There may be some support in the record of the The Schooner Exchange to
support this interpretation. For example, there may have been a dispute in the district
court about whether the United States had established that the schooner was a public
vessel. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 119-20 (reporter's
commentary). But the libelants' objection on this point was not pressed before the
Supreme Court, so it is unlikely that the Court intended to limit the Executive's
suggestion to the fact of the foreign sovereign's ownership. See also The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 334-35 (1822) (resolving dispute about whether ship
was a foreign public vessel without input from Executive Branch).
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particular, with Attorney General Pinkney's contention that the
"executive department . . . alone represents the sovereignty of the

nation in its intercourse with other nations."160 It is also consistent
with the Court's implication in a later case that it would construe the
general statutory grants of jurisdiction as a basis for adjudicating
suits against a foreign sovereign if the United States "expressly
exerted" power over the foreign sovereign.16 1 This statement suggests
that the Court would look to the Executive Branch for the express
exertion of power. If Congress enacted a statute authorizing suit
against some foreign sovereign, that statute would establish the
courts' jurisdiction; there would be no need to rely on general
jurisdictional grants.
It is tempting to suggest another reason the Court may have
believed that separation-of-powers principles required the Executive
Branch's participation in foreign sovereign immunity determinations.
Recall that the United States appealed the adverse circuit court
decision; France did not participate in the litigation.1 6 2 This might
imply that the Executive Branch suffered an injury to some legally
cognizable interest, because the requirements of standing "must be
met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by
persons appearing in courts of first instance." 163 In the absence of
standing, the Supreme Court would have lacked Article III
jurisdiction over the appeal. 164 Since Congress had not conferred on
the Executive Branch any power to assert foreign sovereign
immunity, the Court must have believed that the Executive Branch
possessed that authority under the Constitution, and the circuit
court's rejection of the Executive's suggestion of immunity caused a
legally cognizable injury sufficient to support appeal.

160.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 132 (1812) (argument of
Pinkney); see also id. at 126 (argument of Dallas).
161.
See The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 71 n.3 (1819) ("[U]ntil such
power be expressly exerted, those general provisions which are descriptive of the
ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals . . . ought not to be so construed as to give
them jurisdiction in a case, in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to
waive its jurisdiction." (emphasis added)); see also The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 146 (stating that the sovereign can indicate an intent to exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign "by employing force").
162.
See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 120 (reporter's
commentary).
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); see id.
163.
("Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than
standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess a direct stake in the outcome."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 516
(1956) ("Only one injured by the judgment sought to be reviewed can appeal.").
164.
See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 64 ("The standing Article III requires must be
met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing
in courts of first instance."); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 54 (1986) (dismissing
appeal for lack of Article III jurisdiction where intervenor defendant lacked standing to
appeal adverse judgment and where defendant state chose not to seek Supreme Court
review).

2011]

HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITYAS SOLE EXECUTIVE LAWMAKING

941

Such an argument would be anachronistic. Modern standing
doctrine, with its requirement of injury in fact, did not emerge until
the Progressive and New Deal eras. 165 In early American
jurisprudence, the federal courts' authority to entertain a suit tracked
a plaintiffs' ability to assert a viable right of action, either under the
common law or under an act of Congress. 16 6 It is clear that the
libellants in The Schooner Exchange asserted a cognizable right of
action in admiralty.167 And Congress had established appellate
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over admiralty suits. 168 Thus, it
seems unlikely that the Marshall Court would have questioned its
constitutional authority to hear the appeal in The Schooner
Exchange.169 Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court
entertained an appeal from the government-a nonparty to the
suit 7 0-is at least suggestive that the Court believed that the
Executive Branch had a special stake in the litigation.
B. From the Law of Nations to the Separationof Powers
The Schooner Exchange thus established the practice under
which courts would look to the Executive Branch for direction on
whether to recognize a foreign sovereign's immunity from suit. 171
Within forty years, the Exchange came to be understood as giving the
Executive Branch an absolute right "to intercept the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the suit" by suggesting the

165.
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-97 (1992) (discussing the
evolution of the modern standing doctrine).
166.
See id. at 173-77 (outlining early American jurisprudence, which did not
require injury in fact or concrete interest for standing).
167.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (giving district courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction"); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (recognizing
district court jurisdiction over admiralty libel seeking restitution for capture alleged to
be in violation of law of nations).
168.
Act of Mar. 3, 1808, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244, 244.
169.
But cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 197 (1882) (questioning whether
the United States, which was not a party to the underlying suit, could "prosecute the
writ of error in its own name," but declining to address the issue because parties to the
suit had filed their own writs of error, raising all the questions addressed by the United
States' writ).
170.
See Percy Summer Club v. Astle, 110 F. 486, 489 (C.C.D.N.H. 1901) (No.
315) (noting that the United States was not a party in the Schooner Exchange
litigation).
171.
See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) ("[Iun The
Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall introduced the practice, since followed in the federal
courts, that their jurisdiction in rem acquired by the judicial seizure of the vessel of a
friendly foreign government, will be surrendered on recognition, allowance and
certification of the asserted immunity by the political branch of the government
charged with the conduct of foreign affairs when its certificate to that effect is
presented to the court by the Attorney General.").
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immunity of the foreign sovereign vessel subject to suit. 172 And, until
the First World War, in the rare suit raising issues of foreign
sovereign immunity, courts generally would apply the baseline
principle of immunity announced by The Schooner Exchange but look
to the Executive Branch for confirmation that the principle should be
applied in the case, at least in suits in which the Executive Branch
participated.1 73 The Executive Branch's authority to direct a
deviation from the immunity rule announced in The Schooner
Exchange was not tested for most of this period, as the Executive
suggested immunity in cases in which it appeared,174 and courts
applied the baseline principle when the Executive Branch did not
participate. 7 5
1.

The First World War and the Rise of State Commercial Activity

That began to change around the First World War. During that
period, governments became increasingly involved in traditionally
private conduct. Thus, for example, foreign governments
requisitioned private ships to engage in commercial activities. 176
Foreign states similarly began using their own vessels, agencies, and
instrumentalities in commerce.' 77 Both of these developments led to
an increase in suits against foreign sovereigns or their property, and

172.
The Pizarro v. Matthias, 19 F. Cas. 786, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 11,199)
(citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)); see id.
("[T]he effect of the procedure is to interdict to the citizen a right of resort to any
judicatory of the country for redress of injuries sustained by him.").
See, e.g., Hassard v. United States of Mexico, 61 N.Y.S. 939, 939-40 (N.Y.
173.
Sup. Ct. 1899) (vacating attachment against foreign sovereign property on motion by
U.S. Attorney on instruction from the Attorney General); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a
Legal Doctrine, 25 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36-37 & n.137 (1940) (noting paucity of foreign
sovereign immunity cases prior to the First World War). When the Executive Branch
did not appear, courts grappled with the question of who could suggest immunity on
the foreign sovereign's behalf. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88.
See, e.g., The Pizarro,19 F. Cas. 786; Hassard,61 N.Y.S. 939.
174.
See, e.g., Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Can., 83 N.E. 876, 877 (Mass. 1908)
175.
(dismissing suit because foreign sovereign defendant was immune); Walley v. The
Schooner Liberty, 12 La. 98, 99 (1838) (same); Leavitt v. Dabney, 37 How. Pr. 264, 268
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868) (same); see also Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491, 493-94, 496-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1883) (stating baseline principle but denying immunity because vessel not in
foreign sovereign's possession).
Riesenfeld, supra note 173, at 38; see A.H. Feller, Procedures in Cases
176.
Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United States, 25 AM. J. INT'L L.
83, 86 (1931) (noting increase in sovereign immunity cases during the First World
War).
See Riesenfeld, supra note 173, at 39-40 (discussing cases involving state177.
owned commercial vessels); Recent Case, Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S.
Christina, [1938] A.C. 485 (H.L.) (Appeal Taken from Eng.), 39 COLUM. L. REV. 510,
512 (1939) ("After the World War there was a great increase of state-owned merchant
marine."); see, e.g., Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 103 A.
397, 398-99 (N.J. 1918) (deciding suit involving foreign state commercial corporation).
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the courts were divided on the immunity of requisitioned vessels and
of foreign sovereign instrumentalities used for commercial
purposes. 7 8 The dominant view was that foreign state
instrumentalities engaged in commerce were immune from suit.'7 9
However, when the Executive Branch did participate in litigation
involving foreign state commercial activity, it generally informed the
courts that it did not consider foreign states to be immune from suit
when they engaged in commercial activity.
In 1921, for example, the State Department informed a district
court that .'[i]t is the view of the Department that government-owned
merchant vessels or vessels under requisition of governments whose
flag they fly employed in commerce should not be regarded as entitled
to the immunities accorded public vessels of war."'180 Similarly, in
1929, the State Department informed another court that
it has long been the view of the Department of State that agencies of
foreign governments engaged in ordinary commercial transactions in
the United States enjoy no privileges or immunities not appertaining to
other foreign corporations, agencies, or individuals doing business here,
and that they should conform to the laws of this country governing such
transactions. 181

178.
See Riesenfeld, supra note 173, at 38 & nn.144-45 (discussing requisition
cases). Compare, e.g., Molina, 103 A. at 398-99 (declining to dismiss suit against
foreign sovereign corporation on foreign sovereign immunity grounds), with The Maipo,
252 F. 627, 628-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (holding Chilean navy vessel chartered to private
person and used in commerce immune from suit because owned and possessed by
foreign sovereign).
179.
See Riesenfeld, supranote 173, at 40 & n.150 (discussing "the main trend of
the lower federal courts" and identifying exemplary decisions).
180.
The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 480 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (quoting Letter from Fred
K. Nielsen, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of State to Julian W. Mack, U.S. District Judge (Aug. 2,
1921)). See generally Other Public Vessels, 2 Hackworth DIGEST § 173, at 427-30.
Earlier, in 1918, the Secretary of State urged the Attorney General to argue, in an
appropriate case in the Supreme Court, that state-owned vessels engaged in
commercial pursuits are not immune from suit. Id. at 429. The Attorney General
declined the suggestion, because he believed such vessels to be immune as the law
now stands"' and, evidently, out of concern that such a rule could undermine the
immunity of merchant vessels owned by the United States. See id. at 430 (quoting
Letter from Tomas Gregory, Att'y Gen., to Robert Lansing, Sec'y of State (Nov. 25,
1918)); id. ("[T]he Department [of Justice] must continue to assert, in all appropriate
cases, the immunity of merchant vessels which are the property of the United States.").
It is not clear whether the "law as it now stands" that the Attorney General had in
mind was domestic or international. However, not long after this exchange, Congress
enacted the Suits in Admiralty Act, which waived the United States' immunity for in
personam suits in cases involving U.S.-owned merchant vessels in which a private
party could be sued in admiralty. See Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41
Stat. 525 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918 (Supp. I 2007)). I
suggest below that the enactment of the Suits in Admiralty Act may have been one of
the factors that encouraged the trend toward absolute judicial deference to the
Executive Branch's articulation of principles of foreign sovereign immunity. See infra
note 184 and accompanying text.
181.
United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1929). In Deutsches Kalisyndikat, the United States brought an antitrust suit

944

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:911

In both cases, the court denied the foreign state's claimed immunity,
noting, in particular, that no claim of immunity had been made by
the Executive Branch.1 82
The Executive Branch's decision not to recognize the immunity of
foreign state instrumentalities engaged in commerce thus conflicted
with the dominant view adopted by most courts in suits in which the
Executive Branch had not participated. The dominant judicial view
also conflicted with the proposal of prominent contemporary
international conferences to subject state commercial activity to
regular judicial process.18 3 And the dominant view was inconsistent
with Congress's decision to waive the United States' immunity from
suit in cases in U.S. courts involving U.S.-owned merchant vessels,
and not to oppose litigation involving such vessels in foreign
courts. 184 Perhaps for these reasons, courts began to deny immunity

against foreign corporations, including a corporation that was an instrumentality of
France. Id. at 200.
Deutsches Kalisyndikat, 31 F.2d at 203; The Pesaro,277 F. at 482.
182.
See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 40 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
183.
concurring) (noting that the State Department's reluctance to grant immunity for
commercial ships owned by foreign government was largely supported by international
conferences held in the 1920s); Recent Case, supra note 177, at 512 n.12 ('The
International Marine Conferences of 1922 and 1926 recommended that governments
should accept full liability for state-owned merchant ships, with the complete support
of the Committee of Experts on the Progressive Codification of International Law and
the Imperial Conference of 1926."). The 1926 International Conference on Maritime
Law, referenced in the case note just cited, produced the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels,
Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Jan. 8, 1937) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. The convention subjects state parties owning or operating commercial
seagoing vessels to the same rules of liability as governs the commercial activity of
private vessels, and it provides for the same adjudication of commercial claims against
states as exists for claims involving private parties. Id. arts. 1-3. Not many states
became parties to the convention; as of 1937, only ten states had ratified the treaty. Id.
at 201 n.2. The United States did not participate in drafting the Brussels Convention
and has never ratified it, although its immunity provisions are broadly consistent with
the position taken by the Executive Branch around the same time, as Justice
Frankfurter suggested.
The Suits in Admiralty Act, enacted in 1920, establishes the immunity of
184.
U.S.-owned merchant vessels from in rem suit (and its attendant seizure or attachment
of the vessel), but authorizes in personam suits against the United States in actions
involving such vessels in circumstances in which a private party could be sued in
admiralty. See Suits in Admiralty Act, §§ 1-2. See generally E. Transp. Co. v. United
States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927) (providing overview of the Suits in Admiralty Act). Section
7 of the Suits in Admiralty Act authorizes the Secretary of State to assert in foreign
courts the immunity of U.S.-owned merchant vessels from attachment or seizure but to
consent to in personam suits against the United States. See Agreements Waiving
Sovereign Immunity, 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 8-11 (1960) (so construing § 7).
The State Department relied on the non-immunity of U.S.-owned merchant vessels
in explaining to foreign states that it does not recognize the immunity of state-owned
commercial vessels. Thus, for example, in its letter to the court in The Pesaro,the State
Department explained that '"[it is the view of the Department [of State] that
government-owned merchant vessels . . . should not be regarded as entitled to the
immunities accorded [to] public vessels of war. The Department has not claimed
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to state commercial enterprises in cases in which the United States
did not appear and suggest the entity's immunity from suit. 185 This
practice reflected a trend toward absolute deference to executive
branch articulation of principles of foreign sovereign immunity, a
trend also reflected in the Supreme Court's channeling of immunity
determinations to the Executive. In cases in which the Executive did
not participate, courts typically would entertain a foreign state's
claim of immunity if the state participated as a litigant in the suit. 186
But many courts also permitted an authorized representative of the
state to suggest immunity, even where the state refused party
status.1 8 7 The Supreme Court eventually rejected that approach,
requiring the foreign state either to appear as a party or request a
suggestion of immunity from the State Department. 8 s
In explanation, the Court relied principally on a dictum from
United States v. Lee,189 a post-Civil War case in which the plaintiff
sued federal officials for the possession of land comprising Arlington
National Cemetery.1 90 In Lee, the United States urged dismissal of
the suit for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the officials were
immune from suit because they possessed the land on authority from
the Executive Branch.1 9 ' The Court rejected that argument and

immunity for American vessels of this character."' The Pesaro, 277 F. at 479 n.3
(quoting Letter from Fred K. Nielsen, Solicitor for the U.S. Dep't of State, to Julian W.
Mack, U.S. District Judge (Aug. 2, 1921)); see also Protection of Human Rights, 2
Hackworth DIGEST § 6, at 439-41 (quoting Letter from Charles E. Hughes, Sec'y of
State, to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Jan. 11, 1923)) (instructing U.S.
diplomatic and consular officials not to claim immunity in in personam suits against
the United States involving U.S.-owned commercial vessels.).
185.
See, e.g., The Secundus, 13 F.2d 469, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1926) (declining to
dismiss suit against foreign state commercial vessel on foreign sovereign immunity
grounds, but giving France sixty days to seek a suggestion of immunity from the
Executive Branch); Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequei, 103 A.
397, 398-99 (N.J. 1918) (declining to dismiss suit against foreign state corporation on
foreign sovereign immunity grounds; noting State Department decision not to ask the
Attorney General to suggest immunity of foreign state corporation); see also The
Attualita, 238 F. 909, 909, 911 (4th Cir. 1916) (reversing dismissal of suit against
commercial vessel requisitioned by Italy where Executive Branch noted the fact of
requisition but did not ask that the case be dismissed on immunity grounds).
186.
See, e.g., The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (dismissing suit against a
naval vessel where foreign state participated in the litigation).
187.
See Riesenfeld, supra note 173, at 46 n.174 (citing cases). This required
courts to determine who was "authorized" to represent the state. See, e.g., The Anne, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 445-46 (1818) (holding that a consul without special authority is
not an authorized representative of a foreign sovereign).
188.
The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 219 (1921); In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33
(1921). See generally Feller, supra note 176, at 86-87 (discussing procedures for
asserting foreign sovereign immunity in courts in the United States from the early
republic through the late 1920s).
189.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
190.
The Pesaro, 255 U.S. at 219 (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 209); In re Muir, 254
U.S. at 533 (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 209).
191.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 198, 220.
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affirmed the judgment returning the property to the plaintiff,
principally because the plaintiffs claim was based on the contention
that the government took the land without just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.192 In reaching that holding, the
Court surveyed its precedent bearing on claims to sovereign
property.' 9 3 Noting its decision in The Schooner Exchange, the Court
explained that principles of foreign sovereign immunity were
"inapplicable to this case" because in suits against foreign sovereign
property, "the judicial department of this government follows the
action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."1 94
The trend toward absolute deference was briefly interrupted in
1926 when the Supreme Court announced its decision in Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. Steamship Pesaro.9 5 In Berizzi Brothers, the Court held that a
foreign sovereign vessel was immune from suit, even though it was
used exclusively for commercial purposes.196 At an earlier stage in
the proceedings, the Executive Branch informed the district court
that it did not recognize the immunity of a foreign sovereign vessel
used in commercial activity.197 The district court denied the claimed
immunity, based, in part, on the Executive Branch's
communication. 198 However, that decision was later vacated because
of a procedural irregularity.19 9 A second judge thereafter heard the
case and dismissed the suit on immunity grounds. 200 The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal in Berizzi Brothers without considering
the Executive's submission in the district court. 201 That decision is
the only case during the period in which foreign sovereign immunity
principles were not codified in which the Supreme Court decided an
immunity claim contrary to the views of the Executive Branch.

Id. at 218, 220, 223. Within three months of the Court's decision, Congress
192.
appropriated funds for the purchase of the land from the Plaintiff. Appropriations Act
of Mar. 3, 1883, ch. 141, 22 Stat. 582, 584.
193.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 209-12.
194.
Id. at 209 ("[It has been uniformly held that these were questions, the
decisions of which, as they might involve war or peace, must be primarily dealt with by
those departments of the government which had the power to adjust them by
negotiation, or to enforce the rights of the citizen by war.").
195.
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
196.
Id. at 574, 576.
The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 480 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); see supra text
197.
accompanying note 180.
198.
The Pesaro,277 F. at 482.
The Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
199.
200.
Id. at 469.
201.
Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 576.
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Uncertainty and Deference

The Supreme Court's decision in Berizzi Brothers was short
lived. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court
continued the trend toward absolute deference, eventually elevating
the Lee dictum to a holding. In The Navemar, the Supreme Court
stated the Berizzi Brothers rule that foreign state-owned commercial
vessels are immune from suit. 20 2 The Court explained that the foreign
state can participate in the litigation to assert "the public status of
the vessel and to claim her immunity from suit."203 Alternatively, the
foreign state can present its claims diplomatically, to the Executive
Branch, and "[i]f the claim is recognized and allowed by the Executive
Branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release
the vessel upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of
the United States, or other officer acting under his direction."204 The
Navemar appears to be the first case in which the Supreme Court
said that courts are required to dismiss a suit against a foreign state
based on the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity. But because
the Executive had not suggested immunity in that case, the
statement was a dictum. 205 Within a few years, however, the
Supreme Court reiterated that courts must defer to the Executive
Branch's assertion of a foreign state's immunity-this time in a
holding. 206 In Ex Parte Republic of Peru, the Court again relied on the
Lee dictum as a justification for judicial deference. 207 Yet neither The
Navemar nor Ex parte Peru addressed what would happen if the
Executive declined to recognize the immunity of a foreign state-owned
commercial vessel, notwithstanding the rule announced in Berizzi
Brothers.
The Court answered that question in 1945 in Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman.20 8 Hoffman held that courts not only must defer to
executive branch suggestions of immunity, they cannot recognize a
foreign state's immunity unless it is founded on a principle recognized
by the Executive. 209 Hoffman thus completed the trend toward
absolute deference to the Executive Branch and constituted a
repudiation of Berizzi Brothers.
In Hoffman, an in rem admiralty action was brought against a
Mexican cargo vessel that damaged an American ship. 2 10 Acting on

202.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938). The suit was an admiralty action
seeking possession of a vessel of which Spain claimed ownership. Id. at 70.
203.
Id. at 74.
204.
Id.
Id. at 74-75.
205.
206.
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943).
Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882)).
207.
208.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 31.
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behalf of his government, the Mexican Ambassador filed in the
district court a suggestion of immunity, stating that when the vessel
was attached, it was in Mexico's ownership and possession.2 11 The
libellant disputed that the vessel was in Mexico's possession, which
put at issue the ship's immunity, because the "overwhelming weight
of authority" denied immunity to vessels owned by foreign states but
not in their possession. 212 The Executive Branch filed a letter from
the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, noting the Mexican
government's claim of immunity. But the letter "took no position with
respect to the asserted immunity of the vessel from suit," except to
cite precedent recognizing immunity when the vessel was in
possession of the foreign state and rejecting it when it was not. 213 The
district court determined that the vessel was in the possession of a
private shipping corporation, which was using the ship for commercial purposes. 214 Consequently, it rejected Mexico's suggestion of
immunity. 215 The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether a foreign state's ownership
without possession was sufficient to establish the immunity of the
ship. 216
In considering that issue, the Supreme Court recited the
conventional story that "[e]ver since The Exchange, this Government"
has recognized the immunity from suit of foreign sovereign vessels in
possession of a foreign sovereign, and that, upon the "recognition,
allowance and certification of the asserted immunity" by the
Executive Branch, courts will surrender their jurisdiction over the
suit. 217 The Court explained that the practice of deference to
executive suggestions is based on "the policy" that "national interests
will be best served" when disputes about foreign sovereign vessels
"are adjusted through diplomatic channels rather than by the
compulsion of judicial proceedings." 2 18 Thus, it is a "guiding principle"
that courts must "follow[ ] the action of the political branch, and will
not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." 2 19
But courts must not only dismiss suits upon the Executive's
suggestion of immunity. Carrying the logic of the Lee dictum to its
conclusion, the Court held that it is "not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an
211.
Id.
212.
Id. at 38.
213.
Id. at 32. The Executive Branch later made a second filing, again taking no
position on immunity but relaying that it accepted Mexico's claim to own the vessel and
Mexico's representation that it would accept any liability that was determined "as a
binding international obligation." Id.
214.
Id. at 32-33.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 33.
217.
Id. at 34.
218.
Id.
Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882)).
219.
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immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize." 2 20 That is because recognition of immunity on principles
not accepted by the Executive "may be equally embarrassing to it in
securing the protection of our national interests and their recognition
by other nations" as would be denying immunity in the face of an
executive suggestion. 221 The Court found "controlling" the fact that,
"despite numerous opportunities like the present to recognize
immunity from suit of a vessel owned and not possessed by a foreign
222
This, the
government," the Executive Branch chose not to do so.
of a
adoption
Branch's
Executive
the
reflected
Court inferred,
"national policy not to extend the immunity in the manner now
suggested."2 23 In light of "duty of the courts . . . not to enlarge an

immunity" that the Executive "has not seen fit to recognize," the
224
In so
Court held that the vessel was not immune from suit.
to
consider
failure
Brothers's
Berizzi
disapproved
Court
holding, the
the Executive's views, noting that "[t]he propriety of thus extending
the immunity where the political branch of the government had
refused to act was not considered." 225 The concurring Justices
welcomed the repudiation, suggesting that the Court had effectively

overruled Berizzi Brothers.226

Id.
220.
221.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
222.
223.
Id.
Id.
224.
Id. at 35 n.1.
225.
Id. at 39 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.).
226.
The history I have just recounted suggests an oddity in the conventional story of
the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. According to that account,
"[u]ntil 1952, the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all actions
against friendly foreign sovereigns." Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 486 (1983). In that year, the State Department issued the so-called Tate Letter, in
which "the State Department announced its adoption of the 'restrictive' theory of
foreign sovereign immunity" under which "immunity is confined to suits involving the
foreign sovereign's public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a foreign
state's strictly commercial acts." Id. at 487; see Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
Application of the restrictive theory "proved troublesome," because, as a result of
diplomatic pressure, "political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases
where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory."
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Thus, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act to clarify the governing standard and relieve the Executive Branch of diplomatic
pressure. Id. at 488. This conventional account of the enactment of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act is inconsistent with the State Department's historical
practice. Although the account (and the Tate Letter itself) suggests that the Executive
Branch's adoption of the restrictive theory in 1952 was a new development, the State
Department in 1921 informed the district court in an earlier stage of Berizzi Brothers
that it would not recognize the immunity of a foreign state vessel used in commerce.
See supra text accompanying note 180. And in 1929 the State Department informed a
different district court that "it has long been [its] view" that foreign sovereigns are not
immune from suits relating to their commercial activities. United States v. Deutsches
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From the Court's announcement of the Hoffman decision in 1945
until Congress's enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in 1976, courts routinely deferred absolutely to executive branch
suggestions of immunity, or did their best to decide claims of
immunity in conformity with the decisions the Executive Branch had
previously announced.2 27 As I have suggested, the trend leading to
absolute deference was probably the result of the combination of an
increased involvement of foreign sovereigns in commerce, a
traditionally private enterprise; uncertainty about the state of
international law, making it difficult for courts to identify the
governing rules of decision; the United States' decision to waive its
own immunity in like circumstances; and a concern that the courts
not undermine the Executive Branch's conduct of foreign relations.
But description is not justification. While these factors might explain
why judicial deference to executive suggestions came about, they do
not in themselves show that deference is constitutionally grounded.
That is, they do not demonstrate that the Executive Branch has the
constitutional power to make law.
Hoffman's gesture towards the Executive Branch's foreign affairs
powers contains the seeds of a justification. Indeed, the separation-ofpowers themes implicit in the United States' argument and the
Supreme Court's decision in The Schooner Exchange came to be the
sole rationale for the practice of judicial deference to executive
suggestions of foreign sovereign immunity.2 2 8 But as we have seen,
the courts' appeal to the Executive Branch's general foreign affairs
powers does not provide a satisfying explanation of the constitutional
basis for this lawmaking. 229 As Henry Monaghan has suggested,
Congress's 1976 enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
rendered the question of judicial deference to executive suggestions
largely a historical curiosity.2 30 Largely, but not entirely: even after
Congress codified the standards governing foreign sovereign

Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200 (1929); see supra text accompanying note
181.
227.
See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198,
1201 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[O]nce the State Department has ruled in a matter of this nature,
the judiciary will not interfere.").
228.
Thus, in 1974, the Fifth Circuit explained that "we are analyzing here the
proper allocation of functions of the branches of government in the constitutional
scheme of the United States. We are not analyzing the proper scope of sovereign
immunity under international law." Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974).
The second sentence would have astounded Chief Justice Marshall. See also Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961) ("We think that the doctrine of
the separation of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume that all
pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in
reaching his conclusion.").
229.
See supra Part II.B.
230.
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 56; see 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) ("Claims of
foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States
and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.").
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immunity, courts continued to defer to the Executive Branch when it
suggested the immunity of a head of state.2 31 Coincident with the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was a significant
232
The Executive
increase in litigation against foreign heads of state.
Branch has not been shy about appearing in such cases and
suggesting the head of state's immunity.23 3 As I will now explain, the
Executive Branch's power to make law by determining the immunity
of sitting heads of state derives from the Constitution's assignment to
the President of the specific authority to conduct the nation's
diplomacy.
C. Executive Suggestions and Executive Diplomacy
It is commonly understood, and not seriously disputed, that
"[t]he President has sole and exclusive authority over diplomacy and
the diplomatic process, the recognition of foreign states and
governments, the maintenance of diplomatic relations, [and] the
conduct of negotiations." 234 The Constitution does not mention the

See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); United
231.
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court recently
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not govern the immunity from
suit of foreign officials generally, thus leaving intact the Executive's practice of
suggesting immunity. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010).
See Dellapenna, supra note 29, at 531 ("In the upsurge of litigation against
232.
foreign states and foreign-state-related entities in the United States that followed the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976, a rather remarkable
number of suits (given the prior dearth of such suits) was filed against heads of foreign
states.").
233.
See cases cited infra Appendix A.
Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
234.
32 (1990); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219 (2d ed. 1988)
("[T]he Constitution plainly grants the President the initiative in matters directly
involved in the conduct of diplomatic [affairs]."). I do not mean to suggest that the
distribution of the foreign affairs powers between the Executive Branch and Congress
is uncontroversial. Many pages have been written on that topic. Compare, e.g., Prakash
& Ramsey, supra note 13, at 355-56 (arguing that the Constitution vests in Congress
relatively little power over foreign affairs), with HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69 (1990)

("In foreign as well as domestic affairs, the Constitution requires that we be governed
by separated institutions sharing foreign policy powers. Under this constitutional
power-sharing scheme, the president, Congress, and the courts all play integral roles in
both making and validating foreign-policy decisions." (footnote omitted)). I am making
the more limited point that there is little controversy that the President "alone
represents the sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations." The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 132 (argument of Pinkney).
Even those who are skeptical of the extent to which the Executive Branch claims
authority over foreign affairs acknowledge that the Constitution assigns only to the
President authority over diplomatic relations. See, e.g., KOH, supra, at 69 (describing,
as among the President's "limited,. . . exclusive powers," the President's authority over
"diplomatic relations and negotiations and . . . the recognition of nations and
governments"); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law:
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power to conduct the nation's diplomacy with foreign sovereigns. But
the assignment of that authority has been implied from specific
powers vested in the President, and the absence of any provision
giving Congress authority to communicate directly with foreign states
on behalf of the United States. The Executive Branch's exclusive
authority to conduct the nation's diplomacy itself implies the
authority to determine the principles governing head of state
immunity. 2 35
1.

The Executive as Sole Diplomat

From very early in our Republic, it was recognized that "[t]he
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations."236 In establishing what
became the U.S. Department of State, the First Congress
acknowledged the Executive Branch's exclusive authority over
diplomacy. The act created the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
office of the Secretary. 237 It directed the Secretary to
perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined
or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to
the Constitution, relative to correspondence, communications, or
instructions to or with public ministers or consuls, from the United
States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or
princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public
ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting
foreign affairs, as the President of the United States shall assign to the
238
said department.

The State Department's organic act thus recognized that a central
foreign affairs function of the Executive Branch is to be the nation's
representative with foreign sovereigns. Moreover, the act authorized
the Secretary to undertake the nation's diplomacy to the extent the
President delegated that responsibility. Neither this statute nor any
other granted the President diplomatic powers. Thus, Congress must
have assumed that this was a specific power vested in the President
by the Constitution, as Michael Ramsey has argued.2 39

Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 206 (2009) ("The President is the sole actor
charged with representing the United States on the international stage.").
Cf. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 54 ("[T]he President's 'specific'
235.
constitutional powers, such as the Commander-in-Chief power and the powers 'implied'
from presidential duties, now (whatever the original understanding) imply some
independent presidential law-making power.").
236.
Marshall Speech, supra note 118, at 613.
237.
Act of July 27, 1789 (Foreign Affairs Act), ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 29. Soon
after, Congress changed the name of the new department to the Department of State.
Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 68, 68.
238.
Foreign Affairs Act, ch. 4, § 1.
239.
RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 76 ("[A]ll the duties detailed in the bill are, by
the Constitution, pertaining to the department of the Executive Magistrate."' (quoting
Rep. Theodore Sedgwick, Statement Discussing Bill that Became the Foreign Affairs
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It was also broadly understood that Congress did not share the
diplomatic power; the authority to communicate directly with foreign
sovereigns was assigned exclusively to the Executive. 240 Thus, for
example, in 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson-"hardly an
exponent of expansive constitutional construction or of large
Presidential power" 2 41-explained to the French Ambassador: "[The
President] being the only channel of communication between this
country and foreign nations, it is from him alone that foreign nations
or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the
nation."242 In a similar vein, in a speech to the House of
Representatives in 1800, then-Representative John Marshall
observed that the Executive Branch
is entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation, with the
negotiation of all its treaties, with the power of demanding a reciprocal
performance of the article, which is accountable to the nation for the
violation of its engagements with foreign nations, and for the
243
consequences resulting from such violations.

And in 1816, the newly formed Senate Foreign Relations Committee
recommended against adopting a proposal that the Senate urge the

Act (June 18, 1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 521 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834))); see
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (noting "the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress").
240.
The Constitution assigns none of the foreign relations powers to the courts.
See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative-'the political'-departments of the government."). It expressly prohibits
domestic states from entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" and
implicitly delegates to the federal government alone responsibility for the nation's
foreign relations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. And the Logan Act, which prohibits
unauthorized citizens of the United States from engaging in diplomatic activity with
foreign states, reflects the understanding that private parties have no constitutional
right to undertake diplomacy on behalf of the United States. Logan Act, ch. 2, § 1, 1
Stat. 613 (Jan. 30, 1799) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006)). Thus, if the
President shares the power to conduct the nation's diplomacy, he would share it only
with Congress.
241.
HENKIN, supra note 26, at 337 n.11.
242.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of State, to Edouard Genit,
Ambassador (Nov. 22, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414, 414 (John
Catanzariti ed., 1997); see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation:
The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, & The Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1023 (2010) ("[In his notes to Genit,] Jefferson
insisted on what is now established doctrine, but which was not stated explicitly in the
constitutional text, that the President is the sole representative of the nation in
communicating with foreign diplomats."); see also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the
Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961) [hereinafter
Jefferson Opinion] ("The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive
altogether. It belongs to the head of that department, except as to such portions of it as
are specially submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.").
243.
Marshall Speech, supranote 118, at 614.
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President to pursue certain treaty negotiations with Great Britain
because
[t]he President is the constitutional representative of the United States
with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign
nations, and must necessarily be the most competent to determine
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiations may be urged with the
greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the
244
Constitution.

There are numerous other examples. 245
The founding generation did not typically explain in any detail
the constitutional basis for the Executive's authority as our nation's
sole diplomat. 246 Some contemporary scholars have argued that the
President's diplomatic powers, like the broader foreign affairs powers
the Executive Branch exercises, derive from the vesting of executive
power in the President.2 4 7 But even if reliance on the Article II
Vesting Clause 24 8 is necessary to explain the full reach of the
President's foreign affairs powers (an issue I do not here address), the
Constitution's specific grants of powers seem to provide ample basis

244.
S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 14TH CONG., 1ST SESS., (Feb. 15, 1816),
reprinted in 7 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789-1901, at 21 (1901).
245.
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21
(1936) (discussing President Washington's refusal "to accede to a request to lay before
the House of Representatives the instructions, correspondence and documents relating
to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty-a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by
the House itself and has never since been doubted"); cf. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 88
("Since the early years, too, Congress has not seriously doubted that the President is
the sole organ of communications with foreign governments... .").
Marshall and Jefferson, for example, seem to appeal to the Article II
246.
Vesting Clause in explaining why the President is the sole representative of the United
States with foreign sovereigns. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 242, at 379 ("The
transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether."); Marshall
Speech, supra note 118, at 613 ("The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. . . . He possesses
the whole Executive power."). Hamilton does as well. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 3840. However, they also rely on the President's role in making treaties, Hamilton, supra
note 13, at 37-38; Marshall Speech, supra note 118, at 614, and in nominating,
appointing, and commissioning U.S. diplomatic officials, Jefferson Opinion, supra note
242, at 379. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 13, at 549 n.19, 654-55, 680
(discussing these sources). Story relied on the Treaty Clause. See JOSEPH STORY, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§

1505 (1833) (stating

that the Treaty Clause makes the President "the constitutional representative of the
nation itself"). But he also placed great emphasis on the Reception Clause. See id. §
1560 ("The power to receive ambassadors and ministers . . . constitutes the only
accredited medium, through which negotiation and friendly relations are ordinarily
carried out with foreign powers. . . . The constitution has expressly invested the
executive with the power to receive ambassadors, and other ministers. It has not
expressly invested congress with the power, either to repudiate, or acknowledge
them.").
See, e.g., RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 78-79; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note
247.
13, at 317-24.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
248.
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for the President's authority to act as the nation's representative in
its dealings with foreign sovereigns. As Curtis Bradley and Martin
Flaherty have argued, each of the enumerated powers identified in
the 1789 Foreign Affairs Act finds a counterpart in specific authority
conferred on the President by the Constitution:
The duty to handle the correspondence, commissions, and instructions
to U.S. "public Ministers or Consuls" finds a provenance in both the
President's power "to appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls," as well as the duty to "Commission all the Officers of the
United States." Likewise, the same duty as applied to "negociations"
with foreign nations fairly clearly alludes to the President's authority
"to make Treaties." The reference to other applications from foreign
public ministers, finally, echoes presidential authority to "receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Further supporting each set
of obligations is the President's authority to "require the Opinion, in
Writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive Departments,
249
upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."

Thus, the statute that principally authorizes the Secretary to
communicate with foreign sovereigns on the nation's behalf, "can be
understood as a function of discrete statutory allocations tracking
specific constitutional grants." 250 The Founders' understanding that
the Constitution vests in the President alone the authority to conduct
the United States' foreign relations has been upheld by the courts
throughout our history.2 51
2.

Diplomacy and Immunity

From a duty the Constitution assigns to the President can be
inferred other authorities of the Executive Branch that are necessary
to permit the President effectively to carry out the constitutionally
delegated power. 252 I have just explained that the Constitution vests
diplomatic functions in the President alone. In this section, I will
show that the Executive Branch's authority to determine the
applicable principles of head of state immunity derives from the
President's role as the sole representative of the United States in its
direct dealings with foreign sovereigns. This follows from two
separate considerations.

249.
Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 13, at 643-44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3).
250.
Id. at 644.
251.
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) ("[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it."); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 652-54
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding unenforceable the statutory provision requiring Executive
Branch to initiate negotiations with foreign states).
252.
See generally Monaghan, supra note 4.
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First, and principally, the Executive Branch's ability to suggest
the immunity from suit of a sitting head of state is necessary to
protect its ability-and that of the President in particular-to engage
in diplomacy at the highest levels. Because of the restrictions of the
due process clause, our courts generally obtain personal jurisdiction
over a foreign head of state when process is served on the official
while he or she is within the court's jurisdiction. 25 3 However, sitting
heads of state almost always visit the United States as part of a
diplomatic mission, usually to meet with the President. And when
heads of state travel to the United States on diplomatic missions, it is
quite often for momentous purposes, such as to engage in discussions
affecting the United States' national security or to consummate an
important treaty. 254 If traveling to the United States would subject a
head of state to private litigation in our courts, the Executive
Branch's ability to conduct diplomacy would be dramatically
impaired. At best, foreign governments would view such suits as a
nuisance. But most foreign states take service of process on a sitting
head of state during a state visit as a major breach of diplomatic
norms, and potentially a violation of international law. 255 Were the
Executive Branch not able to suggest the foreign leader's immunity,
thereby addressing the problem, the suit against the head of state
could affect the course of the diplomatic discussions, and foreign
leaders might be dissuaded from visiting the United States at all.2 56

253.
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) ("Among the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over
nonresidents who are physically present in the State."). Although the Burnham case
produced a fractured Court, all of the Justices agreed that, under the doctrine of
transient jurisdiction, a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant by
service of process on the defendant while he or she is within the court's jurisdiction.
So-called long-arm jurisdiction is not generally available in suits against foreign
heads of state. Heads of state typically lack sufficient contacts with the forum to
support "general jurisdiction." See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 & n.9 (1984) (explaining that courts may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant "in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with
the forum" provided that the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum). And
the matters for which heads of state are sued usually do not arise out of their contacts
with the forum. Thus, "specific jurisdiction", is typically not available. See id. at 414
(discussing concept of specific jurisdiction). See generally cases cited infra Appendix A.
254.
See, e.g., The President's News Conference with President Dmitry A.
Medvedev of Russia, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1 (June 24, 2010) (noting
discussions concerning reductions in nuclear weapons); Bernard Gwertzman, Egypt
and Israel Sign Formal Treaty, Ending a State of War After 30 Years; Sadat and Begin
Praise Carter'sRole, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1979, at Al (noting that Egyptian President
Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin signed peace treaty at White House).
255.
See SATOW's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 9 (noting
that head of state's immunity from the civil jurisdiction of state that he or she is
visiting is firmly established in customary international law).
256.
As a matter of customary international law, sitting heads of state are
generally completely immune from the civil jurisdiction of a foreign state. Id.
Accordingly, these same considerations apply to suits instituted against foreign heads
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These concerns are neither idle nor exaggerated. For example, in
the litigation against Chinese President Jiang Zemin, 257 the United
States filed in the district court a declaration from a State
Department official detailing the consequences of the suit. Jiang had
stopped in Chicago while en route to a meeting with President George
W. Bush in Crawford, Texas.258 Under an alternative service order,
practitioners of Falun Gong attempted to effect service by leaving
process with Jiang's Chicago security detail. 259 When the Chinese
government learned of the suit, it "immediately and forcefully
protested to the Department of State."260 The Chinese Ambassador to
the United States, who was traveling with Jiang, informed the State
Department that the suit "could have a most deleterious impact on
the atmosphere surrounding the Crawford summit and on the
bilateral relationship." 26 1 Next, the Ambassador, the Chinese
Executive Vice Minister, and a high official in the Chinese Foreign
Ministry each approached State Department officials "to register the
Chinese government's serious concerns about the matter and to insist
that the U.S. side take immediate steps to address" the suit. 262 And
in China, the Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister called in the U.S.
Ambassador "to stress the Chinese Government's objection to the suit
and to make clear that it could have a serious negative impact on
U.S.-China relations." 263
As with most head of state visits, the agenda for President
Bush's meeting with President Jiang included matters of great
interest to the United States, including critical issues of national
security. 264 The lawsuit against President Jiang thus threatened to
disrupt the summit and interfere dramatically with the President's
ability to effectively conduct the nation's diplomacy. In fact, suits
against high-ranking Chinese officials already had affected the
United States' diplomatic relations. The State Department informed
the court that the Chinese government had refrained from sending
representatives to the United States on prior occasions because of the
of state visiting in a non-official capacity, and to suits in which service is attempted
abroad. However, service on heads of state in this country on an official visit appears to
be the historical norm, see cases cited infra Appendix A, and for the reasons discussed
immediately above, would seem to be the best opportunity for prospective plaintiffs to
effect service.
257.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-78.
258.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
259.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
260.
Declaration of Donald W. Keyser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State for the
Bureau of E. Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State T 7 (Dec. 10, 2002)
[hereinafter Keyser Declaration], attached as Tab A to United States Suggestion of
Immunity, supra note 15.
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
Id.
264.
Not long before President Jiang's visit, North Korea had disclosed its
nuclear weapons program. See supra note 46.
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possibility that its leaders could be subject to private lawsuits in U.S.
courts. 265 The State Department explained that "[t]he consequences
of a reluctance by foreign leaders and officials to come to the United
States to engage in diplomacy are potentially severe for the
government's ability to conduct foreign relations." 266
The effect of such suits could not be contained within our shores,
as the State Department also emphasized. Were courts to permit
suits such as this one to proceed, "it is increasingly likely that foreign
governments and judicial authorities will be inclined to permit
service and legal proceedings that may be detrimental and
embarrassing to high-level United States officials visiting abroad."267
The reciprocal conduct of foreign states would thus threaten to
undermine the international practice of according head of state
immunity to our own high government officials.2 68 For these reasons,
the suit against Jiang would be "disruptive to the conduct of our
foreign relations," and could have "potentially serious adverse
consequences."26 9 The Executive Branch's ability to direct the
dismissal of private suits against sitting heads of state is thus critical

Keyser Declaration, supra note 260, 4. The State Department also noted
265.
the highly problematic nature of the alternative service the district court permittedthrough the U.S. security detail guarding Jiang. Id. 3. The declaration suggested that
permitting service through U.S. officials directly interferes with the Executive Branch's
ability to communicate with foreign states by making foreign officials suspicious of U.S.
5. The declaration relayed an incident, occurring prior to the suit, in
officials. Id.
which a Chinese embassy official refused to accept a communication from a State
Department official for fear that he would unintentionally accept judicial process. Id.
"Exchanging diplomatic notes and written positions between governments is the
essence of diplomacy," the State Department explained. Id. Thus, alternative service
orders such as the one in this case could "severely hamper[]" the United States' ability
to communicate with foreign governments and to implement its foreign policy. Id.
4. The State Department here appears to be referring to suits against
266.
Id.
officials who likely would not qualify for head of state immunity. The Supreme Court
recently held that the State Department continues to have authority, after the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, to determine the principles of
immunity governing suits against all foreign officials. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2291 (2010). Although this Article might suggest a constitutional basis for the
Executive Branch's suggestions of immunity for officials who do not otherwise qualify
for head of state immunity, that is not its focus. I quote the State Department's
concerns about the willingness of foreign officials to visit the United States because
they are fully applicable to visits from heads of state.
267.
Keyser Declaration, supra note 260, 9.
268.
Id.
9-10. Some commentators have argued that litigation against
269.
Id.
Chinese officials for human rights abuses has not produced irreparable harm in SinoAmerican relations. E.g., Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign
Relations: A "Sinical" Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights
Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2002). However, even such skeptics at least
implicitly recognize that suits against high-ranking Chinese officials raise the potential
for significant harm to the Executive Branch's conduct of our foreign relations. See id.
at 525-27 (arguing that recognition of head of state immunity "might be effective in
warding off suits that are claimed to pose some of the potentially most serious
problems for U.S. foreign policy").
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to maintaining channels of diplomatic communication at the highest
levels.27 0
The first consideration, just discussed, concerns the mechanics of
diplomacy. A second, subsidiary consideration concerns its content.
As we have seen, head of state immunity is a longstanding doctrine of
customary international law.2 71 Customary international law is based
on the practice of states, followed out of a sense of legal obligation. 272
All three branches of government have a role in identifying
customary international law. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of

Nations." 273 The First Congress relied on that authority to
criminalize piracy and attacks on ambassadors. 274 And Congress
again relied on that authority in enacting the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. 275 The courts also have a role in identifying
customary international law. The Supreme Court has held that U.S.
courts have some limited authority to apply customary international
law norms in creating federal common law rights of action under the
Alien Tort Statute. 276 The Executive Branch also has a considerable
role in identifying customary international law norms, as it has the
principal responsibility to ensure that the United States complies
with its international obligations. 277
However, over the course of our constitutional history, the
Executive's role has increased in proportion to that of the other
branches. Early in our nation's history, the law of nations was the
unwritten international law.278 One important strand of the

270.

Cf. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 42 ("As 'sole organ', the President determines

also how, when, where, and by whom the United States should make or receive
communications, and there is nothing to suggest that he is limited as to time, place,
form, or forum.").
271.
SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 9.
272.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
273.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

274. Act of Apr. 30 ,1790, ch. 9, §§ 8, 28, 1 Stat. 112, 113, 118.
275.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604 ("Constitutional authority for enacting such legislation derives from the
constitutional power . . . to define offenses against the 'Law of Nations' ....
); S. REP.
NO. 94-1310, at 12 (1976) (same).
276.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-31 (2004). There is a dispute
about whether courts properly have this authority, after the elimination of general
common law as a basis for decision (at least in diversity cases) in U.S. courts. See
sources cited supra note 136. Courts may also properly rely on customary international
law in some circumstances when interpreting federal statutes and considering defenses
to claims. See VAzquez, supra note 136.
277.
See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 235 ("[The President] is the direct and
principal repository of the international obligations of the United States. Under the
Constitution, the President, as the national Executive and under his Foreign Affairs

authority, has the power and the duty to carry out the U.S. obligations under
international law.").
278. Dodge, supra note 135, at 536.
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eighteenth-century American understanding of the law of nations was
premised on the idea that principles of international law could be
deduced by reason. 279 Another strand derived law-of-nations
principles from state practice.28 0 But over time, the customary strand
of the law of nations came to be synonymous with unwritten
international law. As eighteenth-century rationalism was superseded
by nineteenth- and twentieth-century positivism, 28 1 it became less
clear that reason would disclose law-of-nations principles and
increasingly important for courts to identify state practice or
consensus as a basis for unwritten international law.2 82 Because
modern customary international law is based on state practice,28 3 it is
not static.284 And because the President alone controls our nation's
direct communications with foreign states, it is the Executive Branch
that speaks for the United States concerning the desirability of one
practice or another. For that reason, the President has the
predominant role in developing customary international law on
behalf of the United States. 285

279.
See Jay, supra note 135, at 821-28 (discussing this strand); Jules Lobel,
The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1084-90 (1985) (same).
280.
Dodge, supra note 135, at 539-40, 542-44.
281.
Legal positivism is a complex doctrine that originated in England with
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin and that evolved as it was incorporated into
American jurisprudence. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding
Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 (1995). But a central and reasonably enduring tenet
of classical positivism was that, rather than deriving from reason, "every valid legal
norm was promulgated by the legal system's sovereign, and the norm's authority can
be traced to that sovereign." Id. at 2064.
282.
See Lobel, supra note 279, at 1112 ("By the latter part of the nineteenth
century, positivism had almost entirely replaced natural law theory in the
international arena."); Dodge, supra note 135, at 544-48 (tracing the shift from natural
law to positivism in the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century international law
decisions).
283.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 102(2) (1987) (describing "customary international law" as "result[ing] from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation").
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (explaining that "an ancient
284.
usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago" can "gradually ripen[] into a
rule of international law"). The legislative history for the Torture Victim Protection
Act, for example, recognizes that international norms "may ripen in the future into
rules of customary international law." H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84; see Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)) (establishing
a civil action against individuals who commit torture or extrajudicial killing while
acting under authority of any foreign nation).
285.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433-34 (1964)
("When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states,
the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and
traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1
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It is, perhaps, because our courts are not generally suited to
developing customary international law (as opposed to applying its
settled principles) that, beginning around the First World War, the
courts looked to the Executive Branch with increasing dependence for
guidance on the applicable principles of foreign sovereign
immunity. 286 As we saw, around the First World War, the dominant
judicial view was that foreign sovereigns are entitled to immunity
from suit in all cases, regardless of the subject of the suit.2 87 But that
view seemed inconsistent with an emerging trend toward state
liability for commercial activity. 2 88 It was certainly inconsistent with
the State Department's view of foreign sovereign immunity. 289 Thus,
it seems likely that, as they began to doubt the stability of the
governing immunity rule in international practice, and in the absence
of any legislative guidance, courts increasingly looked to the
Executive Branch for the applicable principles.
The Executive Branch's authority to determine the applicable
principles of head of state immunity thus finds additional support in
the President's constitutional authority to speak for the nation in
support of principles that should bind the international community.
That advocacy can occur in traditional diplomatic exchanges with
other states. But the Executive Branch also can advocate on behalf of
certain head of state immunity principles by directing courts to adopt
them in suits against foreign, high-ranking government officials. 290 In
doing so, the Executive Branch participates in the development of

reporter's note 2 ("The United States role in the development of customary
international law . . . consists in substantial measure of governmental and diplomatic
practice, largely, though not exclusively, the work of the President and those acting on
his behalf."); HENKIN, supra note 26, at 43 ("[The President] acts and speaks the part of
the United States in the subtle process by which customary international law is
formed."); Hathaway, supra note 234, at 209 ("[T]he sole power to communicate on
behalf of the nation on the international stage is not to be underestimated. . . . It
carries with it an absolute veto power over international lawmaking."); Beth Stephens,
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish . . . Offenses
Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 538-39 (2000) ("[The
executive branch participates in the formation of customary [international] norms, sifts
through emerging norms, and determines which norms reach binding status.").
286.
See supra text accompanying notes 176-201.
287.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
288.
See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
289.
See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
290.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Presidents role in the
development of customary international law compels courts to accept as a rule of
decision any principle the President wishes to endorse internationally. The limited
point I am making is that where the Executive Branch has independent constitutional
authority to determine the governing rule, that authority is supplemented where the
rule is one that the Executive Branch wishes to advocate as a matter of customary
international law. Accordingly, the President's role in developing customary
international law is subsidiary to the President's role as the nation's diplomat in
justifying the Executive Branch's authority to determine principles of head of state
immunity.
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customary international law, and exercises its constitutional
authority as the nation's "sole representative with foreign nations."2 91
D. Some Objections Considered
In the next Part, I will consider the roles of the coordinate
branches of government in head of state immunity determinations
under the theory I have advanced. But before turning to that, I will
address two objections to the argument made here. The first objection
is that there is a simpler, textual basis in the Constitution on which
to ground the Executive Branch's authority to determine head of state
immunity: the Reception Clause. 292 The second objection questions
whether an executive branch determination of head of state
immunity is really lawmaking or something else.
1.

Diplomacy or Reception?

The Constitution assigns to the President alone the power to
"receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." 293 Historically,
that authority has been understood to encompass more than the
ceremonial reception of foreign diplomats who visit the United States
on official business. Because the power to receive ambassadors
includes the power to decide which ambassadors to receive and,
hence, with which governments to establish diplomatic relations,
since the founding, the Executive Branch has claimed the sole
authority to recognize which government represents a foreign
state. 294 In 1793, for example, President Washington asked his
cabinet whether he should receive the ambassador from the
republican government of France, the first emissary from that state
since the revolution overthrew the French monarchy. 295 The cabinet
unanimously recommended that Washington receive the ambassador,
and all agreed that the President need not consult Congress before
doing so. 2 9 6 To this day, Presidents claim the exclusive right to

Marshall Speech, supra note 118, at 613.
291.
292.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id.
293.
294.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 204 cmt. a (explaining that the President's authority to recognize foreign
governments "is implied in the President's express constitutional power to appoint
Ambassadors (Article II, Section 2) and to receive Ambassadors (Article II, Section 3),
and his implied power to conduct the foreign relations of the United States").
295.
George Washington to the Cabinet, (April 18, 1793), in 25 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 568-69 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992).
296.
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Washington's Questions on Neutrality and the
Alliance with France, in 25 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 295, at 666.
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recognize foreign governments, and that power is firmly
established. 29 7
Some have suggested that the President's authority to determine
foreign state immunity prior to the enactment of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act stemmed from the President's recognition
power.298 More recently, after the Supreme Court's Samantar
decision, 299 others contend that the Reception Clause supports
executive branch determination of foreign official immunity, at least
where the immunity turns on the official's status, such as head of
state or accredited diplomat.3 00 I have argued that the Executive
Branch's authority to determine governing principles of head of state
immunity is an incident of the President's exclusive control over the
mechanics of diplomacy, and the President's predominant role in
representing the United States in the development of customary

297.
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)
("Political recognition [of a foreign government] is exclusively a function of the
Executive."); HENKIN, supra note 26, at 43 ("It is no longer questioned that the
President does not merely perform the ceremony of receiving foreign ambassadors but
also determines whether the United States should recognize or refuse to recognize a
foreign government . . . ."). The Supreme Court is likely to address the President's
recognition power during the 2011 Term in Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, No. 10-699 (to
be argued Nov. 7, 2011). See 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (granting certiorari).
298.
See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1635-36 (2007) (suggesting that the President's power regarding
immunity "was arguably an incident of recognition"); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive
Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 367-68 & n.380
(2006) (arguing that the President's exercise of the recognition power "may carry
derivative effects in domestic law," including effects on foreign sovereign immunity).
The Supreme Court, however, did not rely on the Reception Clause in its decisions
requiring absolute judicial deference to executive branch suggestions of foreign state
immunity. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (justifying
executive deference on the ground that the court should not "embarrass the executive
arm in its conduct of foreign affairs"); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588
(1943) ("[A]n overriding principle of substantive law" is "that courts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign,
as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.");
see also HENKIN, supra note 26, at 56 (noting that the Supreme Court "invoked only
general Executive powers in foreign affairs").
299.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (holding that the FSIA does not
govern the immunity of foreign officials from suit).
300.
See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 35, at 71 ("Courts should treat Executive
representations about status-based immunity as conclusive because they are a function
of the Executive's power under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution to accredit
diplomats ('receive ambassadors') and, by implication, to recognize foreign heads of
state."); Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2712 (2011) ("Executive Branch 'suggestions of immunity' for
heads of state and diplomats are controlling on the judiciary, in recognition of the
Constitution's assignment of the power to 'receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers' to the President." (footnote omitted)). Wuerth argues that courts should
defer only to the Executive Branch's determination of the official's status. Wuerth,
supra note 25, at 971. Wuerth suggests that immunity will follow as a matter of course
and that "courts will rarely have a role to play," but she does not identify the source of
domestic law from which the immunity determination flows. Id.
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international law. 30 1 Perhaps the Reception Clause provides a less
complicated basis for this power.
Relying entirely on the Reception Clause as the basis for the
Executive Branch's authority to determine head of state immunity
has much intuitive appeal. As noted, there is little question that the
President's exercise of authority under the Reception Clause has
substantive domestic effect, including determining which government
represents a foreign state. 30 2 And the Supreme Court has held that
the President's recognition of a foreign government has implications
for suits in our courts involving foreign states. Thus, "[i]t has long
been established that only governments recognized by the United
States and at peace with us are entitled to access to our courts, and
that it is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to
determine which nations are entitled to sue."30 3 In addition, the
Court has held that some executive acts taken pursuant to the
Reception Clause can affect the private rights of citizens. For
example, as part of its decision to recognize the Soviet government of
the USSR, the Executive Branch negotiated a sole-executive
agreement (an agreement made with a foreign state without
participation by either chamber of Congress) under which it espoused
and settled the claims of U.S. nationals relating to the Soviet Union's
expropriation of private property.30 4 The Supreme Court held that
settling the claims of U.S. nationals against a foreign state "is a
modest implied power of the President," which is necessary to avoid

301.
See supra Part III.C.2.
302.
See supra note 293-97 and accompanying text.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1978); see id. at 320
303.
(describing the rule as one of "complete judicial deference to the Executive Branch");
see also, e.g., The Rogdai, 278 F. 294, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1920) (dismissing admiralty libel
brought by Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic seeking possession of a ship in
control of the overthrown Russian government, where the Executive Branch had not
recognized the new government).
304.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1937). "Espousal," a form
of diplomatic protection, see supra note 113, is an act by which a country resolves the
claims of its nations against a foreign state or foreign nationals, typically in exchange
for payment by the foreign state. See Asociaci6n de Reclamantes v. United Mexican
States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing espousal). Espousal through
executive agreement goes back at least to the turn of the nineteenth century and is
well established. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 (1981) (noting
that presidents have exercised executive agreements to settle the claims of nationals
since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in 1799); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 213 cmt.

a (1965) ("[I]t is clear

that the government of the United States can, without consent of the injured party,
effect a waiver or settlement that relieves the foreign state of further responsibility.").
Espousal is a practice that the Executive Branch continues to employ from time to time
to obtain compensation for injuries to U.S. nationals by foreign states. See, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 13,477, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,965 (Oct. 31, 2008) (espousing claims of U.S.
nationals against Libya, pursuant to executive agreement with Libya, for injuries
related to state-sponsored terrorism).
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30 5
"thwart[ing] or seriously dilut[ing]" the recognition authority.
Thus, it might be thought, the Reception Clause and the recognition
power that is inferred from it provide more than enough authority for
the Executive Branch's determination of head of state immunity.
There is no doubt that the Reception Clause plays an important
role in explaining the Executive's constitutional authority to
determine head of state immunity. 306 In my view, however, the
Reception Clause is not alone sufficient to justify complete judicial
deference to the Executive Branch. The Reception Clause features
prominently in what are historically the most common suits against
heads of state: suits in which service is attempted while the foreign
official is in the United States on a diplomatic trip. Such suits
implicate the heartland of the Reception Clause, since they involve
the President's decision to receive a foreign, high-ranking official as
the representative of a foreign state. Those who propose reliance on
the Reception Clause as the source of the Executive Branch's
authority to determine head of state (or other status-based) immunity
appear to assume that the power to receive the official includes the
power to determine the conditions under which the official will be
received, including the official's amenability to suit. But that
supposition is not unassailable.
The Supreme Court has not accepted a similar argument
concerning the recognition power, which, as I have noted, is an
authority inferred from the Reception Clause. While it is settled that
courts are bound by executive branch decisions to recognize
particular persons and governments as representatives of foreign
states, the Supreme Court has not held that courts are similarly
bound by the Executive's views concerning the legal effect of such
recognition; quite the opposite. In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
United States, the Supreme Court "accept[ed] as conclusive . . . the
determination of our own State Department that the Russian State
was represented by the Provisional Government through its duly
recognized representatives from March 16, 1917, to November 16,
30 7
The Court
1933, when the Soviet Government was recognized."
explained, however, that, although the Executive Branch's "action in
recognizing a foreign government and in receiving its diplomatic
representatives is conclusive on all domestic courts, which are bound
to accept that determination," nevertheless, courts "are free to draw
for themselves [the determination's] legal consequences in litigations
pending before them."30 8 The Court went on to reject the
government's argument that a state statute of limitations was tolled
during the period between the Soviet Revolution and the United

305.
306.
307.
308.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229, 230 (1942).
See infra text accompanying notes 324-25.
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 138 (1938).
Id.
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States' recognition of the Soviet government because the Soviet
government could not bring suit on the claim during the period of
non-recognition. 3 09
The Guaranty Trust principle that courts are bound by the
Executive's recognition decisions but are free to determine for
themselves the legal consequences of recognition is a consistent
theme in the Supreme Court's central decisions, resulting from
litigation in the wake of President Roosevelt's recognition of the
Soviet government, addressing the Executive's recognition power.310
Thus, in United States v. Bank of New York, the Court rejected the
government's argument that the Executive Branch's recognition of
the Soviet government divested a New York state court of in rem
jurisdiction over assets held on deposit in the name of a nationalized
Russian company. 3 1' The Court explained: "Whatever the effect of
recognition, it is manifest that it did not terminate the state
proceedings."31 2 In United States v. Belmont, the Court accepted as
determinative the Executive Branch's recognition of the Soviet
government.3 13 But, in rejecting the contention that New York state
policy against confiscation prohibited acknowledging the Soviet
government's interest in the property at issue, the Court applied the
judicially-crafted doctrine that executive branch recognition of a
foreign government "is retroactive and validates all actions and
conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of
its existence." 314 And, in United States v. Pink, the Supreme Court
gave no deference to the Executive Branch in deciding that the
executive agreement's preferential treatment of U.S. nationals over
foreign creditors of Russia did not offend the Fifth Amendment.3 15
Head of state immunity is a legal consequence flowing from the
fact of recognition: an individual may be immune from suit as a
sitting head of state only if the Executive Branch recognizes the
individual as a high-ranking official within the government of a
foreign state. Accordingly, the Guaranty Trust principle weakens the
contention that the Reception Clause alone can support the practice
of complete judicial deference to executive branch head of state
immunity determinations.

309.
Id. at 140. The Court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled
because, during that period, the United States continued to recognize the so-called
Provisional Government of Russia, which could have brought suit. Id. at 138-39 & n.4.
310.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 204 reporter's note 1 ("The Court's principal 'recognition' decisions dealt with
the President's recognition of the Soviet regime as the government of Russia.").
311.
United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1936).
312.
Id.
313.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
314.
Id. at 328 (discussing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)).
315.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942). Earlier in the decision, the
Court rejected the claim that the Soviet nationalization orders did not have
extraterritorial effect, relying on Belmont. Id. at 221-26.
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But perhaps there is a way to distinguish head of state immunity
from other legal consequences of recognition. One might argue that,
unlike the legal consequences discussed above, head of state
immunity most centrally involves the question of amenability to suit.
In this way, the Executive's determination of head of state immunity
is similar to the President's claims settlement authority: espousing
the claims of U.S. nationals against a foreign state has the
consequence that those claims may no longer be pursued in
litigation. 316 The Court has described the President's claims
settlement authority as "a modest implied power" of the recognition
authority.3 1 7 Perhaps the authority to determine head of state
immunity is similar. Even if this is so, it is not especially helpful in
justifying complete judicial deference to executive branch head of
state immunity determinations. Outside the context of establishing or
"rehabilitating"31 8 relations with a foreign state, the Court has
upheld the Executive Branch's authority to settle claims principally
because Congress demonstrated its implicit approval of the practice
by
enacting
legislation
implementing
claims
settlement
agreements.3 19 There is no similar history of congressional
Branch's practice of
enactments
supporting the Executive
determining head of state immunity. There is only congressional
silence. 320 It may be argued that congressional inaction in this
context is itself evidence of congressional acquiescence. 321 But the

316.
For example, the Executive Order implementing the 2008 U.S.-Libya
Claims Settlement Agreement espoused and settled the covered claims of U.S.
nationals against Libya and provides that "[n]o United States national may assert or
maintain any claim within the terms of Article I [of the claims settlement agreement]
in any forum, domestic or foreign, except under the procedures provided for by the
Secretary of State." Exec. Order No. 13,477 § 1(a)(i), 73 Fed. Reg. 65,965 (Oct. 31,
2008).
317.
Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
318.
Id. at 230.
319.
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-82 (1981) (discussing
legislation and describing Congress's implicit approval as "[c]rucial to our decision
today"); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-31 (2008) (noting the importance
of congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement agreements); Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (same).
320.
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010) ("[A]1though
questions of official immunity did arise in the pre-FSIA period, they were few and far
between. The immunity of officials simply was not the particular problem to which
Congress was responding when it enacted the FSIA." (footnote omitted)).
321.
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300 (1981) ("[C]ongressional
acquiescence may sometimes be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an
administrative policy."); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)
("[A) long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the [practice] had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a
recognized administrative power of the Executive .... ).
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absence of supporting legislation makes the case for acquiescence
significantly more difficult. 322
Moreover, because grounding the authority to determine head of
state immunity solely on the Reception Clause requires reliance on
the recognition power, and because the recognition power is itself an
inferred authority, the Reception Clause cannot provide a purely
textually based foundation for the Executive's head of state power. In
this regard, reliance on the Reception Clause alone offers no
advantage over a theory, such as that presented here, that grounds
the Executive's authority over head of state immunity on a different
inferred power of the President.
Although Reception Clause is, at best, an uncertain basis for the
practice of complete judicial deference to executive branch
determinations of head of state immunity, there remains a broad
consensus, even among those who are generally skeptical of the
Executive Branch's role in making foreign official immunity
determinations, that courts must defer not only to the Executive
Branch's identification of a foreign head of state, but also to its
determination of legal consequences of that recognition in suits
against a head of state in our courts. 323 Either this consensus is
mistaken, or there is a different basis for the Executive's authority.
The consensus is not mistaken. As explained above, the President's
constitutional authority to serve as the United States' sole diplomat,
and his role as the representative of the nation in the development of
customary international law, together provide the basis for the
Executive's authority to determine head of state immunity. 324 The
Reception Clause plays an important role in explaining the Executive
Branch's authority to determine head of state immunity, as one of the
express constitutional delegations of power from which the
President's exclusive control of diplomatic functions is inferred. 325
But the Reception Clause, standing alone, is insufficient to justify

322.
See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("It is at best
treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of
law.").
323.
See decisions cited infra Appendix A; see also, e.g., Keitner, supra note 35,
at 71 C'Courts should treat Executive representations about status-based immunity as
conclusive because they are a function of the Executive's power under Article II, § 3 of
the Constitution to accredit diplomats ('receive ambassadors') and, by implication, to
recognize foreign heads of state."); Rutledge, supra note 41, at 914 ("[H]ead of state
immunity represents a limited area, traceable to an express constitutional provision,
where the Executive Branch appropriately enjoys an adjudicatory role." (referring to
the Reception Clause)); Stephens, supra note 300, at 2712 ("As a result [of the
Reception Clause], courts defer to Executive Branch suggestions of immunity as to
diplomats and heads of state.").
324.
See supra Part III.C.2.
325.
See supraPart III.C.1.
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complete judicial deference to executive branch determinations of
head of state immunity. 326
2.

Lawmaking or Something Else?

Apart from the source of the Executive Branch's authority to
determine head of state immunity is a question about the character of
the Executive's act. I have argued that the Executive Branch engages
in undelegated lawmaking when it makes head of state immunity
determinations. But is that so? Perhaps the Executive Branch's
suggestions of head of state immunity are something short of
lawmaking, even if the courts treat them as binding. In this section, I
will consider some objections to the notion that the Executive Branch
makes law when it directs the dismissal of suits on head of state
immunity grounds. The objections stem from two considerations: that
assertions of head of state immunity do not directly extinguish
claims, and that determinations of head of state immunity are based
on customary international law. As will be seen, there are good
reasons, both conceptual and historical, for viewing executive branch
determinations of head of state immunity as lawmaking.
A court's dismissal of a suit against a sitting official based on the
Executive Branch's assertion of head of state immunity is not a
determination on the merits; such suits typically are dismissed
without prejudice.3 27 That is to say, even though it cannot be litigated
at that time, a plaintiffs claim survives dismissal of the suit. It can
be espoused and settled by the Executive Branch in an agreement
with the foreign state, 328 or, if the claim does not come within the
foreign official's residual immunity, the claim can possibly be
relitigated after the foreign official leaves office.3 29 It is true that the
dismissal of a suit, as a practical matter, might make it very unlikely

In addition to the deficiency discussed in the text, reliance on the Reception
326.
Clause is problematic in atypical suits in which service on a head of state is attempted
abroad. Such cases do not implicate the heartland of the Reception Clause since they
do not involve the President's decision to receive a visiting official. Thus, even if the
President's power to receive a foreign official implies the authority to determine the
legal terms and conditions under which the official will be received, that power would
not explain the President's authority to determine head of state immunity in cases
where suit is initiated when the foreign official is not within the United States.
See, e.g., Howland v. Resteiner, No. 07-CV-2332, 2007 WL 4299176, at *1
327.
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (dismissing without prejudice suit against sitting Prime
Minister of Grenada because defendant may not be immune from claims after leaving
office).
See supra note 304 (discussing the Executive Branch's authority to espouse
328.
and settle claims).
See, e.g., Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that
329.
district court dismissed earlier suit against diplomat without prejudice because
defendant might not be entitled to immunity from claim after leaving post); see also
supra note 44 (explaining that, under customary international law, former heads of
state are entitled to immunity only for acts taken in an official capacity while in office).
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that the plaintiff will ever vindicate the claim asserted. Espousal and
claims settlement is entirely discretionary,3 3 0 and often undertaken
to resolve diplomatic friction.3 31 Thus, there is no guarantee that a
frustrated plaintiff will be able to obtain satisfaction through
diplomatic protection. Resort to self-help once the official leaves office
is no more certain, as it may be difficult to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a former foreign official who remains in a foreign
state. 332 Nevertheless, because a suggestion of immunity does not
extinguish a plaintiffs claim against the foreign official, it might be
thought that any effect the Executive's action has on the plaintiffs
rights is incidental, and does not amount to lawmaking.33 3
The thought's- premise-that executive branch determinations of
head of state immunity do not directly affect substantive rights-is
correct. Indeed, the Executive's suggestions of immunity do not
address the validity of the claims asserted or purport to extinguish
them. 334 Nevertheless, the idea that lawmaking is limited to acts
directly affecting substantive rights is overly restrictive. Although an
action having "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons" is "essentially legislative," 335
lawmaking is not limited to the regulation of substantive rights or
primary conduct. Congress engages in lawmaking when it establishes
rules to regulate disputes concerning substantive rights, such as
those in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which define the
immunity of foreign states from suit.336 It is uncontroversial that

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
330.
STATES § 212 cmt. a (1965).
331.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981).
332.
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 n.20 (2010).
333.
Thought of this way, the Executive Branch's authority to determine head of
state immunity can be analogized to the Supreme Court's authority to prescribe rules
of procedure under the Rules Enabling Act. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006)). Congress authorized the Court "to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" governing "cases in the United
States district courts . . . and courts of appeals." § 2072(a). But to protect its authority
over lawmaking, Congress provided that any such rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." § 2072(b). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
limitation as permitting it to adopt "[riules which incidentally affect litigants'
substantive rights" so long as they are "reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity
of that system of rules." Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1987). See
generally Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the
Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 26 (2008) (defending an incidental effects interpretation of the Rules Enabling
Act). Similarly, the Executive Branch's authority to determine head of state immunity
might be thought proper because it is necessary to preserve the President's
constitutional diplomatic function and because suggestions of immunity have only an
incidental effect on plaintiffs' substantive rights.
See, e.g., United States Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 15; see also
334.
Taft Letter, infra Appendix B.
335.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
336.
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Congress acted legislatively when it passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. 337 If Congress engaged in lawmaking when it
codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, there is
no good reason for distinguishing the Executive Branch's preenactment conduct, when it identified the governing immunity
principles applied by the courts. The Executive Branch's continued
practice of determining principles of head of state immunity similarly
qualifies as lawmaking. 338
branch head of state immunity
Moreover,
executive
determinations share one of the central characteristics of federal law:
they are binding in state court proceedings and preempt inconsistent
state law.33 9 Accordingly, courts treat head of state immunity
determinations as "law" under the Supremacy Clause,3 40 at least
implicitly. Head of state immunity determinations are thus
lawmaking in a very basic, constitutional sense. Conceiving of head of
state immunity determinations as preemptive substantive law is also

337.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983)
("Congress, pursuant to its unquestioned Article I powers, has enacted a broad
statutory framework governing assertions of foreign sovereign immunity.").
338.
The Executive Branch's suggestions of head of state immunity might not be
lawmaking if they represented purely ad hoc, foreign policy-based decision making
rather than the implementation of a prescriptive rule that can be applied in future
cases by the courts. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (explaining
that, before enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, in suits against
foreign states in which the Executive Branch did not participate, courts would
determine whether the foreign state was entitled to immunity under principles
accepted by the Executive). However, although the State Department has
acknowledged foreign relations concerns among its reasons for recognizing and
allowing the immunity of a head of state, it has generally explained that its
determinations of head of state immunity are based on its adoption and application of
the governing customary international law principles. See, e.g., Taft Letter, infra
Appendix B.
339.
See Guardian F. v. Archdiocese of San Antonio, No. 93-CI-11345 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65798.pdf
(dismissing suit against Pope John Paul II pursuant to executive branch suggestion of
head of state immunity); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 581 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (App. Div.
1992) (same for suit against unnamed head of state); Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d
303, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (same for suit against Paloma Cordero de la Madrid, the wife
of the President of the United Mexican States); Chong Boon Kim v. Kim Yong Shik
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1963) (same for suit against Korean Foreign Minister Kim), summarized
in Richard B. Bilder et al., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 165, 186-87 (1964).
340.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). There is a debate
about whether anything other than statutes enacted by Congress properly qualifies as
"Laws of the United States ... made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. See generally
Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010).
This Article contributes to that debate insofar as it suggests that the Executive
Branch's determination of head of state immunity is law made pursuant to the
Executive Branch's constitutional authority, legally binding in state and federal courts.
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consistent with the courts' historical treatment of the Executive
Branch's determinations of foreign state immunity before the
enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In Hoffman, for
example, the Supreme Court described judicial deference to executive
foreign state immunity determinations as "an accepted rule of
substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
courts."34 1 And state courts held that they were bound by the
Executive Branch's immunity determinations, regardless of state
law. 342 In this regard, the Executive Branch's immunity
determinations have the same domestic law effect as executive
agreements settling claims of U.S. nationals against foreign states,
which also preempt inconsistent state law,34 3 and which are
commonly understood to be examples of sole executive lawmaking. 344

341.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945); see also Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (describing executive branch determination
of foreign state immunity as "an overriding principle of substantive law" requiring
relinquishment of jurisdiction).
342.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Nat'l Inst. of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So.2d
581, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ("The determination of immunity by the Department
of State and the filing of the suggestion in this case, effectively terminated the power
and jurisdiction of the trial court with reference to matters contained in the
suggestion."); Republic of Cuba v. Dixie Paint & Varnish Co., 123 S.E.2d 198, 198 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1961) (determining that, in light of suggestion of immunity, "the trial court
was without further jurisdiction of the case and the attachment should have been
dismissed"); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265, 272 (1945) (describing
executive branch foreign sovereign immunity determinations as "hav[ing] the force of
law"); F. W. Stone Eng'g Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mex., 42 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. 1945)
("Such being the Department's province, the Secretary of State, in furtherance of our
Government's friendly relations with the Republic of Mexico, formally recognized the
defendant as a governmental instrumentality of that power and, as such, entitled to
sovereign immunity in a court in the United States.").
343.
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229, 230 (1942) (holding that an
executive agreement settling claims of U.S. nationals against foreign state preempted
state law determining priority of creditors); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
330-32 (1937) (holding that an executive agreement settling claims of U.S. nationals
against foreign state preempted state law denying recognition of foreign state property
rights acquired through extraterritorial expropriation); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) ("[V]alid executive agreements are fit to preempt
state law, just as treaties are . . . ."). But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-32
(2008) (holding that President's authority to settle claims through executive
agreements does not empower the President to require state compliance with decision
of International Court of Justice).
344.
See HENKIN, supra note 26, at 228 ("At least some sole executive
agreements . . . can be self-executing and have some status as law of the land."
(discussing claims settlement agreements as examples)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 115

reporter's note 5 (2011) ("A sole

executive agreement made by the President on his own constitutional authority is the
law of the land and supreme to State law." (citing Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 and Pink,
315 U.S. at 229)). But see Clark, supra note 298, at 1575 (arguing that the Constitution
does not give President authority to make executive agreements that are enforceable as
a matter of domestic law); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 144 (1998) (arguing that, as an original
matter, executive agreements were not understood to be supreme law of the land).
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Even if head of state immunity determinations are binding on
the courts and preempt inconsistent state law, they may not be
executive branch lawmaking for another reason: the Executive
Branch may not make the law. As I have noted, head of state
immunity has deep roots in customary international law. 345 And
under customary international law, sitting heads of state are
absolutely immune from civil suit in a foreign court, regardless of the
nature of the claim. 346 In virtually all suits to date against sitting
heads of state, the Executive Branch has appeared to inform the court
that the foreign official is immune from suit.347 In "determining" head
of state immunity, then, the Executive Branch may be doing nothing
more than identifying the applicable customary international law
principles for the court to apply. Courts have some authority to apply
customary international law in cases properly before them. 348 Thus, it
may be courts that are making law when they accept and apply the
principles the Executive Branch identifies.
The problem with this conception of head of state immunity is
that it is shared by neither the Executive Branch nor the courts, the
two actors that implement head of state immunity in our domestic
legal system. For its part, the Executive Branch believes that it
determines the applicable principles of immunity. In the Jiang case,
for example, the State Department informed the Department of
Justice that, having taken into account customary international law,
it "recognizes and allows the immunity of President Jiang from this
suit."34 9 And the government's suggestion of immunity informed the
district court that "courts of the United States are bound by
suggestions of immunity, such as this one, submitted by the
Executive Branch," and courts may not "second-guess" the
Executive's determinations.3 50 Thus, the Executive Branch believes
that courts have no discretion to look behind the suggestion of
immunity to determine for themselves the applicable principles of
customary international law. In addition, the Executive reserves for
itself the right to modify the applicable principles governing head of

345.
See supra note 63.
346.
See supra note 63.
347.
See cases cited infra Appendix A.
348.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) ("For two
centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the
law of nations."); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."). The courts' constitutional authority to apply
customary international law without congressional authorization is contested. See
sources cited supra note 136.
349.
Taft Letter, infra Appendix B.
United States Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 15, at 15-16.
350.
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state immunity. 3 51 And although "international law principles
certainly have a substantial impact on the policy decisions made by
the Executive Branch in this area," in the Executive's view "they do
not govern." 352 Thus, the Executive Branch does not perceive its role
to be a passive conduit of customary international law. This is in
keeping with the President's role as the nation's advocate for
desirable principles of customary international law. 353
Courts, for their part, have a similar view of their role and that
of the Executive Branch. While they understand that customary
international law recognizes the immunity of sitting heads of state, 354
courts have generally recognized that it is for the Executive Branch
alone to determine whether to apply the customary international law
principles in a particular case.3 55 In Wei Ye, for example, the Seventh
Circuit explained that its principal task was "to ascertain the proper
relationship between the Executive and Judicial Branches insofar as
the immunity of foreign leaders is concerned." 3 56 Addressing that
question, the court held that the Executive Branch's head of state
immunity determination "is conclusive and a court must accept such
a determination without reference to the underlying claims of a
plaintiff."3 57 And the court recognized and endorsed the Executive

351.
See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
supra note 67, at 30 n.13 ("[Ilt does not follow from the fact that the Executive Branch
has the constitutional power to assert head-of-state immunity in cases regardless of the
type of conduct alleged that it will do so in every case involving serious human rights
abuses. As noted, the Executive Branch's decision in each case is guided by
consideration of international norms and the implications of the litigation for the
Nation's foreign relations.").
352.
Id. at 31 n.14.
353.
See supratext accompanying notes 271-91. But see Jay, supra note 135, at
835 (arguing that Framers of the Constitution believed the President had a duty to
ensure compliance with the law of nations on matters within the Executive Branch's
competence); Lobel, supra note 279, at 1116-20 (arguing that the President lacks
inherent constitutional authority to act contrary to customary international law); cf.
Jay, supra note 135, at 849 ("Notwithstanding the fascination we may feel for the
events of the early Republic in regard to international relations, their contextual
differences from world affairs today should lead us to view the various statements
about the law of nations from that era as having no bearing on modern controversies.").
354.
See, e.g., Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Hous., 408 F. Supp.
2d 272, 277 (S.D. Tex. 2005); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D.
Fla. 1990).
355.
See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) ("We are
no more free to ignore the Executive Branch's determination [of head of state
immunity] than we are free to ignore a legislative determination concerning a foreign
state."); Roman Catholic Diocese, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 278 ("The executive's
determination is not subject to additional review by a federal court."); Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. at 1520 ("Since the only reason Noriega would be entitled to immunity as a head
of state is because of . . . judicial deference to the Executive, his claim to a 'right' of
immunity against the express wishes of the Government is wholly without merit.").
356.
Wei Ye, 383 F.3d at 626.
Id.
357.
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Branch's reservation of the right to recognize exceptions to head of
state immunity.35 8
Neither the courts nor the Executive Branch view customary
international law as dictating the scope of head of state immunity
that the Executive may recognize as a matter of domestic law. It is
thus the Executive Branch that makes law when it determines the
effect to be given to customary international law in our courts and
when courts defer to the Executive's determinations.3 59
IV. THE BOUNDARIES OF SOLE EXECUTIVE LAWMAKING

In this final Part, I will address the roles of the other two
branches of government, Congress and the courts, in determining and
applying principles of head of state immunity. As a general matter,
the Constitution gives Congress and the Executive Branch
overlapping foreign affairs authority.36 0 Thus, the question arises:
even if the Executive Branch has authority to define principles of
head of state immunity, does Congress also have that power? If it
does, would an act of Congress override a conflicting determination of
the Executive Branch concerning head of state immunity? And what
is the role of the courts? Do they have any authority independently to
develop head of state immunity principles as a matter of federal
common law? If not, do they have any role in cases in which the
Executive asserts head of state immunity, other than to dismiss the
suit?
Congress very likely does have some authority to legislate
concerning head of state immunity. But that authority is cabined by
the principle that Congress may not act so as to diminish the
Executive Branch's ability to conduct the nation's diplomacy. Courts
are similarly constrained and cannot act to limit the President's
exercise of a specific constitutional authority. Accordingly, their
principal role is to guard the separation of powers by protecting the
President's sole authority to speak for the nation in its relations with
foreign states, while ensuring that the Executive Branch does not act
outside its constitutional power.

358.
Id. at 627 ("Just as the FSIA is the Legislative Branch's determination that
a nation should be immune from suit in the courts of this country, the immunity of
foreign leaders remains the province of the Executive Branch. . . . Pursuant to their
respective authorities, Congress or the Executive Branch can create exceptions to
blanket immunity. In such cases the courts would be obliged to respect such
exceptions.").
359.
See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 56 n.262 ("[Tbo the extent that the courts
defer to the Executive acting without statutory authority, it is the latter who claims the
right to define the legal rights of American citizens.").
360.
See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) ("[T]he Constitution
entrusts to the President and the Congress [the field of foreign affairs].").
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A. The Scope and Limits of Head of State Immunity:
The Executive Branch and Congress
Congress has undoubted constitutional authority over important
aspects of foreign affairs.3 6 1 The Constitution gives it the power "[tjo
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,"36 2 to "regulate the
Value . .. of foreign coin," 363 "[tlo declare War, grant Letters of

Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water,"364 "[t]o raise and support Armies," 365 "[t]o provide and
maintain a Navy," 366 and "[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 367 In addition, the Senate
has the authority to provide its "Advice and Consent" to treaties the
President may negotiate, and to the ambassadors the President
nominates. 368 Most important for present purposes, Congress has the
authority "[tjo define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." 369
The Define and Punish Clause gives Congress authority to
implement in our domestic law principles of existing customary
international law, and to provide a mechanism for redress of their
violation.3 70 As I have noted, the First Congress relied on its Define
and Punish power to criminalize attacks on ambassadors, a longstanding violation of the law of nations.3 7 1 It relied on that same
authority more recently in enacting the Foreign Sovereign

361.
See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) ("Although there is in the
Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective
regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the
law-making organ of the Nation."), overruled on other grounds, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967).
362.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

363.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See supra note 113 for a brief explanation of Captures
364.
and Marque and Reprisals Clauses.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
365.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
366.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
367.
368.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
369.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

370.
See generally J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to
Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007)
(arguing that the clause authorizes Congress to codify international legal obligations to
regulate individuals and domestic states as well as to take coercive measures against
foreign states for violations of international law); Stephens, supra note 285 (arguing
that the clause authorizes Congress to implement in civil and criminal domestic law
the nation's international obligations).
See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (criminalizing violence
371.
against ambassadors and other public ministers); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004) (noting that an attack on an ambassador was such a serious
violation of the law of nations during the Founding Era that, "if not adequately
redressed could rise to an issue of war.").
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Immunities Act.3 72 Head of state immunity is a doctrine with a long
history in the law of nations. 3 73 Could Congress similarly rely on its
authority to define and punish offenses against that law to codify
principles of head of state immunity, as some have urged? 374 The full
reach of Congress's authority under the Define and Punish Clause is
not well understood.3 75 In addition, Congress's power to act in an area
where the Constitution gives the Executive Branch specific authority
raises complicated questions not readily answerable in the
abstract. 3 76 There are, however, some identifiable general principles
that shape the contours of Congress's power to legislate concerning
head of state immunity. It is fundamental to separation-of-powers
jurisprudence that one branch of government may not exercise its

372.
S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 12 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604. The FSIA regulates the civil liability of foreign
sovereigns. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 685 (2004). One might think
that the power to "define and punish ... offenses" is only a grant of authority to create
crimes based on the law of nations, especially in light of its inclusion in a provision
authorizing Congress to define and punish "Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. However, the Supreme Court has
suggested that civil torts are encompassed within the term "offenses." Sosa, 542 U.S. at
723-24. The Court has also noted without comment Congress's grounding of the FSIA,
in part, on the Define and Punish Clause. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 493 n.19 (1983). And there is reason to believe that the Founding generation
understood "offenses" to be remediable through civil as well as criminal law. See
generally Stephens, supra note 285, at 490-504 (providing overview of the Framers'
views of "offenses against the law of nations," eighteenth-century usage of "offenses,"
and the Constitution's usage of "offenses"). For other statutes grounded on Congress's
power to define and punish the law of nations see Kent, supra note 370, at 861-68.
373.
SATow's GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supranote 63, at 9.
374.
See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 29, at 532 (proposing amending the FSIA
to include the political head of state within the definition of "foreign state" and to add a
provision prohibiting service of process on a visiting head of state); Mallory, supra note
93, at 187-88 ("Congress, working with the executive branch, as it did in adopting the
FSIA, should develop a standard of immunity for heads of state that meets the
domestic and foreign policy interests of the United States, and then defer to the courts
for the application of that standard."); Shobha Varughese George, Note, Head-of-State
Immunity in the United States Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1076-82 (1995) (proposing amending the FSIA to apply
restrictive theory of immunity to heads of state).
375.
See Kent, supra note 370, at 847 ("Among Congress's powers, there is
probably none less understood or subject to such widely varying interpretations as the
Law of Nations Clause [i.e., the Define and Punish Clause]."). As a matter of original
intent, it appears that the constitutional drafters adopted the Define and Punish
Clause to authorize Congress to receive and implement international law, not to create
it.

See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST

PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 180 (1997) ("The power to "punish" offenses seems to have been
included in order to make clear that the subject was one of federal rather than state
concern; the power to 'define' them was added because of a conviction that the law of
nations was 'often too vague and deficient to be a rule."' (footnote omitted) (quoting 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 615 (Max Ferrand, ed. 1937)

(Gouverneur Morris))); RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 346-50 (similar); Stephens, supra
note 285, at 475 (similar).
376.
See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 54 n.259.
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constitutional authorities in a manner that encroaches upon or
diminishes the constitutional powers of the others.3 77 Thus, for
example, Congress may not use its spending power to limit the effect
of a presidential pardon.3 78 Similarly, Congress could not use its
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations to
limit the Executive Branch's exclusive constitutional authority to
conduct the nation's diplomacy. 379 This principle has the following
consequences for Congress's power to codify head of state immunity.
First, Congress undoubtedly could enact legislation affirming the
President's authority to determine the immunity of heads of state and
directing the President's subordinates in the Executive Branch to
follow the President's directions. 380 Congress has previously enacted
legislation along these lines relating to the President's diplomatic
functions.38 Still within Congress's authority would be a statute
codifying the current customary international law of head of state
immunity, or implementing a treaty codifying that law, but directing
courts to accept executive branch suggestions of head of state
immunity diverging from the codified standard. Congress did
something just like this with respect to the immunities of foreign
diplomats who are members of permanent diplomatic missions in the

377.
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) ("Even when a
branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . [it must] not impair another in the
performance of its constitutional duties."); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988)
("[T]he system of separated powers and checks and balances established in the
Constitution was regarded by the Framers as a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010) ("[T]he Constitution vests certain powers in
the President that 'the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify."' (quoting James
Madison, Statement Discussing Bill that Became the Foreign Affairs Act (June 16,
1789), in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834))).
378.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 133-34, 147-48 (1871) (holding
unconstitutional a proviso in an appropriation act because, in part, the proviso
"impair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the
Executive"); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (giving the President power to grant pardons
for offenses against the United States).
Cf. Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign
379.
Appropriations Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
(Office of Legal Counsel opinion concluding that
olc/2009/section7O54.pdf
appropriations provision prohibiting expenditure of funds to send a delegation to
certain United Nations commission "impermissibly interferes with the President's
authority to manage the Nation's foreign diplomacy").
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (empowering Congress to enact legislation
380.
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof').
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) ("[Wlhen representing the United States
381.
in the respective organs and agencies of the United Nations, [U.S. representatives]
shall, at all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President transmitted
by the Secretary of State unless other means of transmission is directed by the
President. . . .").
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United States, an issue implicating both the President's authority to
receive ambassadors and other foreign ministers3 82 as well as
Congress's power to define offenses against the law of nations.38 3 For
many years, settled customary international law specified that
foreign diplomats are generally immune from the jurisdiction of
domestic courts.38 4 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
a treaty to which the United States is a party, codified those
customary international law principles in 1961.385 And in enacting
the Diplomatic Relations Act, 386 Congress, in part, implemented the
United States' obligations under the Vienna Convention. That statute
generally provides that suits against diplomats must be dismissed if
the defendant would qualify for immunity under the Vienna
Convention.3 8 7 However, the act authorizes the President, "on the
basis of reciprocity and under such terms and conditions as he may
determine," to specify a diplomat's immunity "which result in more
favorable treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided
under the Vienna Convention."3 88 The Diplomatic Relations Act thus
preserves the President's domestic authority to diverge from the
immunity standards identified in the Vienna Convention. In this way,
the statute respects the constitutional authority of both political
branches. 389

U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
382.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715
383.
(2004).
See, e.g., Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 362 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand,
384.
J.) (recognizing that "diplomatic officers are exempt from all civil or criminal
jurisdiction of the state to which they are accredited" is a principle "generally accepted
as part of international law"); EILEEN DENzA, DIPLOMATIC LAw 1 (3d ed. 2008) ("These
rules protecting the sanctity of ambassadors and enabling them to carry out their
functions are the oldest established and most fundamental rules of international law.").
Vienna Convention, supra note 43; see Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458
385.
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The principles embodied in the Vienna Convention were for the most
part already established under customary international law."), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); see also DENZA, supra note 384, at
516 (noting "near universal participation" among sovereign states in Vienna
Convention).
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (2006), 28 U.S.C.
386.
§§ 1251, 1351, 1364 (2006).
Id. 22 U.S.C. § 254(d); see id. § 254(b) (extending immunity to diplomats
387.
whose state is not a party to the Vienna Convention).
Id. § 254(c).
388.
I should note that I am not suggesting that, by authorizing the President to
389.
diverge from Vienna Convention standards, Congress intended to protect the
President's diplomatic prerogatives under the Constitution. I have found no evidence to
support such a claim. More likely, Congress was implementing a provision of the
Vienna Convention. See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 47 (authorizing
restrictive application of convention, or more favorable treatment than required by
convention, on the basis of reciprocity); S. REP. NO. 95-958, at 5 (1978) (explaining that
§ 254(c) "reflects Article 47 of the Convention"). My claim, instead, is that the statutory
provision has the effect of respecting the President's constitutional authority under the
Reception Clause.
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At the other extreme, Congress likely could not enact a statute
entirely abrogating head of state immunity. Nothing in the
Constitution makes customary international law a limit on
Congress's legislative authority, of course. From early in our nation's
history, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may enact
legislation deviating from the law of nations.39 0 But the Executive's
ability to suggest head of state immunity is necessary to preserve the
Executive Branch's ability to conduct the nation's diplomacy at the
highest levels.39 1 Because Congress may not act so as to diminish a
constitutional power vested in the Executive Branch, it could not
properly rely on its specific grants of authority, such as its authority
to prescribe the jurisdiction of the federal courts,39 2 to abolish head of
state immunity.
Between these extremes is more difficult ground. Congress, for
example, could enact into domestic law the current customary
international law standard of head of state immunity, but without
requiring deference to executive branch suggestions that diverge from
the standard. Arguably, Congress did something like that in 1976
when it codified the restrictive theory3 93 of foreign state immunity in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. As discussed above, by at
least the 1920s, the State Department recognized a restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity, under which foreign states are not
immune from suits relating to their commercial activities.39 4 In 1952,
the State Department declared that the restrictive theory had become
"widely held and firmly established," along with the older, absolute
theory of foreign sovereign immunity.393 By 1976, the State

390.
See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("If it be the will
of the government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is
supposed to apply to us, the government will manifest that will by passing an act for
the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations which
is a part of the law of the land."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. a (1987) ("An act of Congress
will ... be given effect as domestic law in the face of .. . a [conflicting] preexisting rule
of customary international law."). William Dodge explains that, in its classic
formulation, the eighteenth-century law of nations contains at least one category of
norms that are binding domestically. Dodge, supra note 135, at 534. While some
American jurists adhered to the view that some law-of-nations norms were
domestically binding, the Supreme Court abandoned that position early in its history.
Id. at 536-44. The Schooner Exchange is a good example. Under the classical
formulation of the law of nations, a foreign sovereign's immunity from the jurisdiction
of another sovereign was a norm from which no derogation was permitted. Id. at 543.
However, the Supreme Court recognized that the United States could subject a foreign
sovereign to its courts' jurisdiction by acting "in a manner not to be misunderstood."
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) at 146; see Dodge, supra note 135, at 54344 (discussing The Schooner Exchange).
391.
See supra Part III.C.
392.
U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 8, cl. 9, 111, § 1.
For a description of the restrictive theory, see supra note 226.
393.
See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
394.
395.
Tate Letter, supra note 226, at 984.
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Department viewed the restrictive theory as settled customary
international law, 396 a view that is reflected in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act itself.3 97 A central purpose of the act was "to transfer
the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch
to the judicial branch,"3 98 and the statute makes no provision for
deference to executive branch determinations that depart from the
codified standard.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act against some constitutional challenges,3 9 9 the Court
has not considered whether the statute impairs the Executive
Branch's constitutional role as the nation's sole diplomat.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that codifying the prevailing
customary international law norm would interfere with the
mechanics of executive branch diplomacy because that norm creates
the baseline against which state conduct is judged. 400 And, indeed, as
a historical matter, adjudication of suits under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act has not resulted in the sort of international objection
that could undermine the Executive Branch's ability to conduct the

396.
Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits againstForeign States, Hearing on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 25 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State) ("Under international law today, a foreign state is entitled
to sovereign immunity only in cases based on its 'public' acts. However, where a
lawsuit is based on a commercial transaction or some other 'private' act of the foreign
state, the foreign state is not entitled to sovereign immunity."); see also id. at 32
(testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litig. Section, Civil Div., Dep't of Justice)
(stating that the bill that became the FSIA "fully comports with . . . international
practice").
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) ("Under international law, states are not immune
397.
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are
concerned."); see Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010) ("[O]ne of the
primary purposes of the FSIA was to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which Congress recognized as consistent with extant international law.");
see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 702 (1976)
(observing that, by 1976, the restrictive theory had "been accepted by a large and
increasing number of foreign states in the international community'); id. at 702 n.15
(collecting foreign cases).
398.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
399.
See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983)
(holding that Congress did not exceed the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution
by granting federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign states where the rule of decision may be provided by state
law).
400.
Some have argued that the so-called "terrorism exception" to foreign
sovereign immunity, added to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1996 and
amended in 2008, does not reflect a principle of customary international law. See, e.g.,
Stewart, supra note 44, at 205-06; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008). However,
that provision applies only to foreign states that the Executive Branch has designated
as state sponsors of terrorism. Id. § 1605A(h)(6). Thus, the Executive Branch retains
considerable control over which states may be sued under the terrorism exception, and
the Executive Branch can take into account the effect of such a designation on its
ability to conduct diplomacy.
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nation's diplomacy. 40 1 Codification of the prevailing customary
international law standard of head of state immunity, under which
sitting heads of state are absolutely immune from civil suit, 402 would
likely be similarly unproblematic in this regard. 40 3
But I have argued that the President's authority to identify
principles of head of state immunity is also supported by the
President's role as the nation's representative in the development of
customary international law. 404 There may be cases where the
Executive Branch would wish to advocate for an emerging trend in
customary international law, for example, a trend that recognizes
certain, limited exceptions to head of state immunity. A statute
codifying existing standards of head of state immunity without giving
the Executive Branch the discretion to diverge from those standards
would inhibit the President's ability to act as advocate, by preventing
the Executive Branch from establishing state practice in the United
States, and, through the existence of inconsistent domestic law, by
undercutting the Executive Branch's diplomatic endeavors. Perhaps,
given Congress's unquestioned legislative primacy, 405 this limited
impairment of the Executive's diplomatic function is insufficient to
undermine the validity of a statute enshrining prevailing
international head of state norms in domestic law, since such a
statute would not interfere with the President's ability to engage in
the mechanics of diplomacy. 406 I am unable to resolve that question

401.
See Wuerth, supra note 25, at 952 ("[E]xperience under the FSIA
demonstrates that although an occasional state immunity decision might have high
foreign policy stakes, most do not.").
402.
See supra note 44.
403.
The proposal of some to codify a "restrictive theory" of head of state
immunity would be considerably more troublesome, as would the codification of any
theory that recognizes anything less than the full immunity of sitting heads of state.
See Bass, supra note 93, at 315-19 (proposing a statute that would exempt from
executive branch suggestions of head of state immunity suits involving acts that violate
international human rights principles); George, supra note 374, at 1077-82 (proposing
codification of restrictive theory of head of state immunity). Such a statute would very
likely interfere with the Executive Branch's ability to conduct the mechanics of
diplomacy, since it would diverge markedly from the existing customary international
law of head of state immunity. See supra note 44 (explaining that, under current
customary international law, heads of state and other high-ranking officials are
generally completely immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts); see also supra
text accompanying notes 257-66 (discussing reaction of Chinese government to suit
against President Jiang and declarations of State Department concerning
consequences of permitting suit).
404.
See supra text accompanying notes 271-91.
405.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States."); see Clark, supra note 298, at 1636 (noting
"the traditional understanding that a statute falling within Congress's constitutional
powers binds the executive no less than the courts").
406.
See supra note 290 (explaining that the President's role in developing
customary international law is subsidiary to the President's ability to conduct
diplomacy in the justification of the Executive Branch's authority to determine
principles of head of state immunity).
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here. However, legislation codifying head of state immunity that
interferes with the President's ability to participate in the
international development of head of state immunity standards at
least raises constitutional questions.

B. The Scope and Limits of Head of State Immunity:
The Executive Branch and the Courts
We saw that until at least the First World War, courts applied
foreign sovereign immunity principles as prescribed by the law of
nations, looking to the Executive Branch principally for confirmation
407
At
that the United States continued to adhere to those principles.
times, disagreement arose about the details of the governing
principles. 40 8 Courts typically resolved these disputes without feeling
409
As the
obliged to obtain the views of the Executive Branch.
governing international principles became less clear and as the
Executive asserted views contrary to the prevailing judicial norm, the
courts began to hew more closely to executive branch articulations of
foreign sovereign immunity principles, until the practice of absolute
deference arose. 4 10 I have argued that, in the context of head of state
immunity, judicial deference is constitutionally justified because
executive suggestions of immunity are integral to protecting the
President's authority to act as the nation's sole diplomat. But do the
courts have any authority to determine the scope of head of state
immunity? Is their only role to dismiss a suit once the Executive
Branch determines that a foreign official enjoys head of state
immunity? The courts have a critical role, but it is not to define the
principles that determine when suits against foreign heads of state
should be dismissed. Rather, the courts' role is to protect the
Executive Branch's diplomatic function by respecting appropriate
assertions of head of state immunity, and to police the outer
boundaries of the Executive Branch's constitutional authority.
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, courts do not have
authority to be creative when it comes to domesticating customary
international law. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court
held that U.S. courts have some limited authority, under the Alien

407.
See supraPart III.B.1.
For example, there was disagreement about whether a foreign sovereign's
408.
ownership of a vessel was sufficient for immunity, or whether the foreign sovereign
also had to be in possession of the ship. See supra text accompanying note 212. See
generally David J. Bederman, The "Common-Law Regime" of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity: The Actual Possession Rule in Admiralty, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 853
(2011).
See, e.g., Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (holding that
409.
foreign state must be in possession of vessel for vessel to be immune from suit and
denying immunity for lack of possession).
See supra Part III.B.2.
410.
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Tort Statute's jurisdictional grant, 41 1 to create federal common law
rights of action for violations of certain customary international law
norms.412 The Court stressed the limited nature of the common law
authority it recognized. The separation of powers was central to the
Courts' concerns. The Court observed that its "watershed" decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 413 reflected a "significant rethinking of
the role of the federal courts in making" federal common law under
which "the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance
before exercising innovative authority over substantive law."414
However, the judiciary has "no congressional mandate to seek out and
define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern
indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the
field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity."4 15
For these and other reasons, "judicial caution" 416 is required and
courts may recognize federal common law rights of action only if they
are based on customary international law norms having "definite
content" and broad "acceptance among civilized nations."4 17 In
addition, the courts' authority to create federal common law rights of
action based on international law norms appears limited to cases
arising under the Alien Tort Statute. 4 18
Sosa addressed only the courts' authority to create common law
rights of action. 419 Thus, the decision did not consider the propriety of
judicial recognition of customary international law in other contexts,
such as common law defenses to claims. Nevertheless, some have
construed the cautions identified by the Court as suggesting
generally that, in the absence of congressional authorization, courts
only have limited constitutional authority to craft customary
international law into rules of decision. 420 Others believe that courts
411.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ('The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.").
412.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
413.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
414.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
415.
Id. at 728.
416.
Id. at 725.
417.
Id. at 732.
See id. at 731 n.19; Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 609-10 (D.C. Cir.
418.
2011) (affirming dismissal of suit, brought, in part, under federal question statute,
asserting violation of customary international law); Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191,
1197 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[Besides the Alien Tort Statute,] no other statute recognizes a
general cause of action under the law of nations."); see also Princz v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("While it is true that
'international law is part of our law,' it is also our law that a federal court is not
competent to hear a claim arising under international law absent a statute granting
such jurisdiction." (citation omitted)).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
419.
420.
See, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 95; David H. Moore,
Medellin, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status of InternationalLaw, 50 VA.
J. INT'L L. 485, 507 (2010); David H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International
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have considerably more flexibility in incorporating customary
international norms into domestic law.421 This is an important
dispute, but it is one I do not intend to engage, except to suggest that,
whatever their authority to make law using international norms,
courts, like Congress, may not act in ways that diminish the
Executive Branch's diplomatic functions. 422
Accordingly, the courts' primary role in cases involving head of
state immunity is to guard the separation of powers. Courts typically
will be called upon to exercise that role in one of two ways, both of
which involve policing the political branches. First, courts must
protect the President's power over diplomacy in cases in which
Congress oversteps and enacts legislation that improperly interferes
with the Executive Branch's ability to determine the applicable
principles of head of state immunity. 4 23 If Congress were to abrogate
the doctrine entirely, for example, it would be a court's responsibility
to abide by an executive branch suggestion of a head of state's
immunity, despite the conflicting statute. 424
Second, it is always the ultimate responsibility of the courts to
determine the extent of the Constitution's commitment of authority to

Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006); see also Wuerth, supra note 25, at 964 (noting
that "many read Erie as having a strong separation of powers component that limits
lawmaking by federal judges" and citing examples of this interpretation).
See, e.g., Green, supra note 136; VAzquez, supra note 136; Ingrid Wuerth,
421.

The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1931 (2010).
Accordingly, a theory under which courts may independently develop
422.
principles governing foreign head of state immunity is incompatible with the account
proposed here. See, e.g., Christopher D. Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official
Immunity in the United States After Samantar: A Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 332 (2011) (arguing that courts should adopt a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis, drawing on domestic and international law, to govern the immunity of foreign
officials, including heads of state). Such a theory fails to give proper regard to the
constitutional foundations for executive branch suggestions of head of state immunity.
It would be no answer to say that if Congress enacts such legislation, the
423.
President consented to it by failing to veto it. See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) ("Perhaps an individual
President might find advantages in tying his own hands. But the separation of powers
does not depend on the views of individual Presidents, nor on whether the encroachedupon branch approves the encroachment. The President can always choose to restrain
himself in his dealings with subordinates. He cannot, however, choose to bind his
successors by diminishing their powers, nor can he escape responsibility for his choices
by pretending that they are not his own.").
424.
Cf., e.g., Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(upholding State Department designation of "Jerusalem" rather than "Israel" as place
of birth in U.S. passport despite statute to the contrary because resolving disputes
concerning foreign sovereign territory, for purposes of U.S. law, is a power vested solely
in the President by the Constitution as part of President's recognition power)
(dismissing suit on political question grounds), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011); id.
at 1233-45 (Edwards, J., concurring) (agreeing on constitutional authority question but
concluding that suit should be dismissed on the merits).
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one of the branches of government. 425 Thus, the courts may properly
consider a claim that a particular executive branch suggestion of
immunity falls outside the President's constitutional powers. But in
undertaking that analysis, the role of the court is not to consider
whether the Executive Branch's suggestion is consistent with
international law.426 The court's focus should instead be on whether
the suggestion reasonably can be viewed as flowing from the
President's sole authority to conduct the nation's diplomacy. 42 7
Accordingly, while it would be appropriate for a court to decline to
recognize a suggestion of head of state immunity made on behalf of a
U.S. citizen who has no relation to a foreign state (an admittedly farfetched example), it is not for the courts to ignore a suggestion of
head of state immunity because customary international law is
unsettled on whether head of state immunity reaches the office in
question.
Under current customary international law, head of state
immunity encompasses the immunity not only of heads of state but
also of other "holders of high-ranking office in a State" such as "the
Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs." 428 A high
official's family members traveling with the official receive similar
recognition under international law. 429 Consistent with this
international understanding, the Executive Branch has suggested the
immunity of heads of state, heads of government, other high
government officials such as foreign ministers, and family members

425.
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1964) ("Deciding whether a
matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.").
426.
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that the more an issue of
international law has significant impact on the United States' foreign relations (and, I
would add, the more significant the issue implicates the Executive Branch's ability to
conduct the nation's diplomacy), the less fit the issue is for judicial resolution. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("It is also evident that
some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do
others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the
weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.").
427.
Cf. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[Wle are analyzing
here the proper allocation of functions of the branches of government in the
constitutional scheme of the United States. We are not analyzing the proper scope of
sovereign immunity under international law.").
428.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
20-21 (Feb. 14).
429.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents art. 1(a), Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (including, within definition of
"internationally protected person," "a Head of State, including any member of a
collegial body performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution of the
State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, whenever
any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family who accompany
him"); SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 63, at 10.
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traveling with these officials. 43 0 Under current customary
international law, it is unclear whether head of state immunity also
applies to suits against certain other very high-ranking officials, such
as a minister of defense. 431 The Executive Branch could reasonably
conclude that affording head of state immunity to foreign ministers of
defense is necessary to preserve the Executive's ability to conduct
diplomacy. The Executive could also reasonably decide to recognize
such immunity to encourage a trend in international law. Should the
Executive Branch assert head of state immunity in a suit against a
to that
defer
should
courts
Minister,
foreign Defense
determination. 432
The district court's decision in Republic of Philippines v.
MarcoS4 33 is instructive. In that case, the district court declined to
recognize what it believed was the Executive Branch's suggestion of
head of state immunity made on behalf of the Philippine Solicitor
General, who was served with a subpoena to compel testimony while
he "was in San Francisco in his official capacity to deliver a speech in
commemoration of the third anniversary of the assassination of
Benigno Aquino, deceased husband of Corazon Aquino, President of
the Republic of the Philippines." 434 The district court declined the
Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity because it believed that
head of state immunity is available only to "a sovereign [or] a foreign
minister, the two traditional bases for a recognition or grant of head
of state immunity."435 Accordingly, it declined to recognize the
suggestion, because it believed that "the government in this instance
seeks to expand the head of state doctrine to encompass all
government officials of a foreign state to whom the State Department
chooses to extend immunity."4 36 The district court nevertheless
recognized the Philippine Solicitor General's immunity under the
Diplomatic Relations Act-despite the fact that diplomatic immunity

430.
See infra Appendix A.
431.
See, e.g., Application for Arrest Warrant Against General Shaul Mofaz,
[2004] EWMC (Crim) (Eng.), reprinted in 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 769, 771-73 (2004)
(recognizing Israeli Defense Minister as enjoying the same immunity as that of a head
of state or foreign minister, but acknowledging that the court "is working in somewhat
uncharted waters"); Katherine Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice, 7 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1087, 1109-12 (2009) (discussing 2007 dismissal by French prosecutor of
criminal complaint against former U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld based on
determination that defense minister enjoys same immunity as that of a head of state or
foreign minister).
432.
See Wuerth, supra note 25, at 971 ("[T]o the extent that international law is
unclear or in a state of development" concerning status-based immunities of foreign
officials, courts should "afford deference to the executive as to the desirable content of
international law.").
433.
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
434.
Id. at 795.
435.
Id. at 797 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 137-38 (1812)).
436.
Id. at 798.
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covers only the members of a permanent diplomatic mission, and
despite the fact that the Philippine Solicitor General was not a
member of the Philippine Embassy, and so was not entitled to
diplomatic immunity.4 3 7
In fact, the Executive Branch did not suggest that the Philippine
Solicitor General enjoyed head of state immunity. Instead, the
Executive Branch's statement of interest in that case is better
understood as an early example of an assertion of "special mission
immunity," an emerging doctrine in international law. 438 Special
mission immunity applies to non-diplomatic foreign personnel "who
have travelled to the United States to conduct official business."4 39
That is, of course, an accurate description of the Philippine Solicitor
General in the Marcos case. 440 And the Executive Branch's statement
of interest, though not entirely free from ambiguity, explained that
the Executive Branch recognized the Philippine Solicitor General's
immunity as a "senior official[] and representative[] of [a] foreign
government[ ] in this country on official business."441 Special mission
immunity is a status-based immunity that directly impacts the
Executive Branch's ability to conduct the nation's diplomacy. Thus,
absolute judicial deference to executive branch determinations of
special mission immunity is justified under the theory developed

Id. at 798-99 (referring to the Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic
437.
Relations Act of 1978, both supranote 43). As noted, see supra text accompanying note
387, the Diplomatic Relations Act establishes the privileges and immunities of
diplomats, as provided for in the Vienna Convention. See 22 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2006). The
Vienna Convention provides for immunities of a "diplomatic agent," who is a member of
a permanent diplomatic mission to the United States (such as an embassy). Vienna
Convention, supra note 43, arts. 1(e), 2, 31. The Philippine Solicitor General was not a
member of the Philippine permanent mission, and so was not entitled to diplomatic
immunities under the Vienna Convention.
438.
See Convention on Special Missions art. 31(2), opened for signature Dec. 16,
1969, 1500 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force June 21, 1985) (providing that members of
a special mission are immune from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving state, with
limited exceptions involving immovable property in the sending state, acts done as an
executor of an estate, commercial activity outside of official functions, and vehicle
accidents when the vehicle is used outside of official functions); Bat v. The
Investigating Judge of the German Fed. Court, [2011] EWHC (QB) 2029, [22] (Eng.);
see also John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations on the Past,
Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts
Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 832 (2011) ("[While] [r]elatively few States
have joined [the Convention on Special Missions] the doctrine is based largely upon
principles of customary international law.").
Bellinger, supra note 438, at 837.
439.
See supra text accompanying note 434.
440,
Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States at 6, Republic of
441.
Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1986) (No. 86-0155); see id.
at 4 ("Under customary rules of international law, recognized and applied in the
United States, the head of a foreign government, its foreign ministers and other
diplomatic representatives, including senior officials on special diplomatic missions,
are immune from the jurisdiction of United States federal and state courts.").
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here. 44 2 Accordingly, it was error for the Marcos district court to ask
whether the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity came within
"the two traditional bases" of head of state immunity. 443 Instead, the
court should have considered whether the Executive Branch's
assertion of immunity was reasonably grounded in the Executive's
constitutional authority to protect its diplomatic function.444 Indeed,
that consideration is what seems to have motivated the court to
misapply diplomatic immunity law to permit it to quash the
testimonial subpoena served on the Philippine Solicitor General. 445
So long as the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity has a
reasonable relationship either to the mechanics of diplomacy or to the
President's authority to advocate on behalf of the United States for
standards governing head of state immunity or other status-based
immunities relating to the Executive's conduct of diplomacy, courts
should give complete deference to the Executive's immunity
determinations.

V. CONCLUSION

The courts have never clearly explained the source of the
Executive Branch's authority to direct the dismissal of private
litigation against a sitting head of state by suggesting the official's
immunity. Adding to the confusion, courts have described the earlier
regime, under which courts deferred to executive branch suggestions
of immunity for foreign states, as creating a "common law" doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. 446 That description obfuscates the

And, with the exception of the Marcos case, courts have deferred to the
442.
Executive Branch's determinations in the few suits against a visiting foreign official in
which the Executive determined that the official enjoyed special missions immunity.
See, e.g., Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2008) ("According due
deference to the Executive Branch, the Court will therefore defer to the Executive's
determination that Minister Bo was immune from service of process for the duration of
the special diplomatic mission."); Kilroy v. Windsor, No. C 78 291 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7,
1978) (deferring to Executive Branch's determination that Prince Charles enjoyed
special missions immunity as a "person[] representing a foreign nation on an official
visit"), excerpted in Special Missions and Trade Delegations, 1978 DIGEST § 3, at 64143.
443.
Marcos, 665 F. Supp. at 797.
444.
Addressing that question would likely have allayed the district court's
concern that the Executive Branch sought "to expand the head-of-state doctrine to
encompass all government officials of a foreign state to whom the State Department
chooses to extend immunity." Id. at 798.
445.
See, e.g., id. at 799 (inferring the State Department's "clear intent to grant
diplomatic status" to the Philippine Solicitor General).
446.
See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284-85 (2010) ("The
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of common law long
before the FSIA was enacted in 1976."); Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 220
(2d Cir. 2004) ("We have some doubt as to whether the FSIA was meant to supplant
the 'common law' of head-of-state immunity .... ).
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separation-of-powers considerations informing the practice. The
confusion about the Executive's authority to suggest a head of state's
immunity has led some to question the propriety of judicial
deference 447 and has prompt'ed others to recommend that Congress
codify the governing standards.44 8 But the Executive Branch's ability
to suggest the immunity from suit in our courts of a sitting head of
state is necessary to protect the President's ability to conduct the
nation's diplomacy. Suggestions of head of state immunity are,
therefore, an exercise of a lawmaking power that is directly implied
from a specific constitutional power of the Presidency.

447.
448.

See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 29, at 531.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 374.
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APPENDIx A: SUITS INVOLVING HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY

This Appendix contains all of the cases I could locate, forty-three
in all, involving determinations of head of state immunity. 449 There
appears to be no case in which a court required a foreign, highranking official to stand suit despite the Executive Branch's assertion
of head of state immunity.
Section A lists twenty-six cases in which a private litigant sued a
high-ranking official of a foreign state or the official's family member,
the Executive Branch suggested the defendant's head of state
immunity, and the court dismissed the suit against the defendant on
that basis. Section B identifies four suits in which the United States
suggested head of state immunity, but the court dismissed the claims
against the defendant on other grounds, or the parties terminated the
litigation before the courts ruled on the immunity question. 450 Section
C notes two suits against former foreign, high-ranking officials in
which the Executive Branch did not participate, and courts applied
the immunity principles they believed controlling. Section D
identifies five cases in which courts refused to dismiss claims against
a defendant on head of state immunity grounds when the Executive
Branch made clear that it does not recognize the defendant as
enjoying that immunity. Section D also notes five suits involving a
former head of state in which courts refused to recognize head of state
immunity when the Executive Branch did not assert it or when the
foreign state waived the former official's immunity.
Section E lists what appears to be the only case in which a court
declined to accept as controlling the Executive Branch's suggestion of

I am grateful to Judith Osborn and Mary Catherine Malin, who helped
449.
locate many of the unreported cases identified in this Appendix.
This Appendix does not generally include suits against a foreign, high-ranking
official in which a court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs the
official's immunity. See, e.g., Baumel v. Syrian Arab Republic, 667 F. Supp. 2d 39
(D.D.C. 2009) (suit against Syrian President Assad); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002) (suit against Iranian Supreme Leader
Khamenei and former Iranian President Rafsanjani). Those decisions have been
superseded by Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). I do, however, list cases in
which a court applied the FSIA despite the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity.
This Appendix also does not include the few cases against a sitting, foreign, highranking official in which the Executive Branch did not suggest head of state immunity
and in which the court did not independently consider the official's immunity from suit.
See, e.g., Asemani v. Ahmadinejad, No. RDB-10-874, 2010 WL 1609787 (D. Md. Apr.
20, 2010) (suit against Iranian President Ahmadinejad).
450.
In Republic of Philippinesv. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the
district court dismissed a suit against the Philippine Solicitor General, holding that the
foreign official enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In so holding, the court declined to accede
to what it understood to be an executive branch suggestion of head of state immunity.
See id. at 798. However, the court appears to have misunderstood the Executive
Branch's suggestion of immunity, which is best understood as an early example of an
assertion of special missions immunity. I discuss the Marcos case supra in the text
accompanying notes 433-45.
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head of state immunity and did not otherwise hold that the official is
not amenable to suit. In that case, a bankruptcy court granted a
debtor's request for permission to pursue a right of action otherwise
belonging to the bankruptcy' estate. One of the potential defendants
was Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and the Executive Branch
objected to the debtor's request, unless the head of state and another
official were removed as possible defendants, pursuant to a
suggestion of immunity. The bankruptcy court held that the
suggestion of immunity was misplaced because the foreign officials
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and because the
Executive Branch could suggest the officials' immunity in any
subsequent litigation. However, there appears to be no record of any
subsequent litigation against President Mubarak.
A.

Executive Branch Suggestion of Head of State Immunity
Filed, Suit Dismissed on that Basis
1. Habyarimana v. Kagame, No. 10-473 (W.D. Ok. Oct. 28,
2011) (unreported) (order dismissing claims against
Rwandan President Kagame, based on Executive Branch's
suggestion of head of state immunity).
2. Balcero Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 10-mc-00764 (JDB),
2011 WL 3926372 (D.D.C. Sept. 08, 2011) (order denying
motion to compel testimony of former Colombian President
Uribe, based on Executive Branch's suggestion of residual
head of state immunity).
3. Al Hassan v. Al Nahyan, No. 09-01106 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2010) (unreported) (order dismissing claims against United
Arab Emirates President Sheikh Khalifa, based on Executive
Branch's suggestion of head of state immunity).
4. Howland v. Resteiner, No. 07-CV-2332, 2007 WL 4299176
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (same for claims against Grenadian
Prime Minister Mitchell and his wife).
5. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Hous., 408 F.
Supp. 2d 272 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same for claims against Pope
Benedict XVI).
6. Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005)
(same for claims against Israeli Prime Minister Sharon).
7. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (same
for claims against Chinese President Jiang Zemin).
8. Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, No. 02-6356
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2003) (unreported) (same for claims
against Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ilham Aliyev), discussed
in Immunity and Related Issues, 2003 DIGEST ch. 10, at 571.
9. Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, No. 02-6356
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2003) (unreported) (same for claims
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against Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev), discussed in
2003 DIGEST ch. 10, at 571.
Rhanime v. Solomon, No. 01-1479 (D.C.D. May 15, 2002),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
57536.pdf (same for claims against Moroccan Foreign
Minister Benaissa).
Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen Rania AlAbdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same for
claims against Jordanian Queen Rania).
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(same for claims against Zimbabwean President Mugabe and
Foreign Minister Mudenge), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
ABC Info., Inc. v. Lloyd, No. 01-03456-GHK (C.D. Cal. Aug.
27, 2001) (unreported) (same for claims against Gabonese
President Bongo).
Marketic v. Kaliber Talent Consultants, Inc., No. CV97-0356CBM, 1998 WL 1147140 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1998)
(unreported) (same for claims against Brunei Sultan
Bolkiah).
First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1119
(D.D.C. 1996) (same for claims against United Arab Emirates
President Sheikh Zayed).
Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.
Tex. 1994) (same for claims against Saudi King Fahd), aff'd,
79 F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996)
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(same for claims against Haitian President Aristide).
Guardian F. v. Archdiocese of San Antonio, No. 93-CI-11345
(Dist. Ct. Tex. 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/65798.pdf (same for claims against
Pope John Paul II).
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 181 A.D.2d 629, 629-30 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (same for claims against unnamed
head of state).45 '
Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988) (same for
claims against British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher),

451.
In the opinion cited here, a New York appellate court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal based on the Executive Branch's suggestion of head of state
immunity. However, after the trial court dismissed the action but before the appellate
court ruled, the Executive Branch informed the trial court that the defendant had
resigned his position as head of state, and it advised that the defendant no longer
enjoyed head of state immunity from suits, such as this one, involving purely private
claims. See Notice of Changed Circumstances Submitted by the United States, Mumtaz
v. Ershad, No. 74258/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1991), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/28495.pdf. There appears to be no record of further trial court
proceedings following the Executive Branch's Notice of Changed Circumstances.
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affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 886 F.2d 438
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (same for
claims against Paloma Cordero de la Madrid, the wife of the
President of the United Mexican States), aff'd, 546 N.Y.S. 2d
506 (App. Div. 1989).
Gerritsen v. De la Madrid, No. CV 85-5020-PAR (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 1986) (unreported) (same for claims against Mexican
President de la Madrid), rev'd as to other defendants on other
grounds, 819 F.2d 1119, 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
Estate of Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1055V (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 23, 1982) (unreported) (same for claims against
Philippine President Marcos and his wife), noted in Estate of
Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1055V, 1983 WL 482332 (W.D.
Wash. July 14, 1983).
Psinakis v. Marcos, No. C-75-1725-RHS (N.D. Cal. 1975),
(same for claims against Philippine President Marcos),
excerpted in State Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional
Immunities, 1975 DIGEST § 5, at 344-45.
Kendall v. Saudi Arabia, 65 Adm. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same
for claims against Saudi King Faisal), reported in Sovereign
Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, May 1952 to
January 1977, 1977 DIGEST app., at 1053-34.
Chong Boon Kim v. Kim Yong Shik (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1963)
(same for claims against Korean Foreign Minister Kim),
excerpted in Richard B. Bilder et al., Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 58 Am. J.
INT'L L. 165, 186-87 (1964).

Executive Branch Suggestion of Head of State Immunity
Filed, Suit Dismissed on Other Grounds or Settled
1. Wang Dan v. Hu Jingtao, No. 05-1788-RMU (D.D.C. Oct. 19,
2006) (suggestion of immunity for Chinese President Hu
Jintao); Wang Dan v. Hu Jingtao, No. 05-1788-RMU (D.C.C.
Mar. 27, 2008) (unreported) (order dismissing suit against
President Hu for failure to demonstrate proper service of
process).
2. Al Fassi v. Abdulaziz, No. 03-3841 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003)
(suggestion of immunity for Saudi King Fahd); id. (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 2003) (order remanding suit for lack of removal
jurisdiction); Al Fassi v. King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz, No. BC
266084 (Sup. Ct. L.A. Oct. 3, 2003) (suggestion of immunity
for Saudi King Fahd); 2003 DIGEST ch. 10, at 571-72
(reporting settlement of suit by parties prior to court ruling
on suggestion of immunity).
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3. Hartmann v. Al Nahyan, No. 94-5547 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
1995), available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/65687.htm
(suggestion of immunity for United Arab Emirates President
Sheikh Zayed); Hartmann v. Al Nahyan, No. 94-5547
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1996) (unreported) (notice of voluntary
dismissal with prejudice).
4. Livingstone v. Estate of Col. Badereddin A. Zaza, No. 64218
(D. Ct. Mont. Oct. 19, 1984) (suggestion of immunity for
Jordanian King Hussein); Livingstone v. Estate of Col.
Badereddin A. Zaza, No. 64218 (D. Ct. Mont. Nov. 5, 1984)
(unreported) (order dismissing suit against King Hussein)
(holding that Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs
immunity of foreign officials), superseded by Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
C.

No Executive Branch Suggestion of Head of State
Immunity Filed, Suit Dismissed under Head of State
Immunity Principles Identified by Court
1. Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (7th
Cir. 2005) (dismissing suit against former Nigerian President
Abubakar), aff'd sub nom. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d
877 (7th Cir. 2005).
2. Tannenbaum v. Rabin, No. CV-95-4357, 1996 WL 75283
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1996) (order dismissing suit against estate
of former Israeli President Rabin, relying on both head of
state immunity principles and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act), superseded in part by Samantar v. Yousuf,
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).

D.

No Executive Branch Suggestion of Head of State
Immunity Filed, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under
Head of State Immunity Principles Denied
1. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011)
(unreported) (order denying motion to dismiss suit against
former Somali President and Defense Minister Samantar,
where Executive Branch determined that no immunity
applied).
2. Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209 (Haw. 1998) (declining to
dismiss suit against former Philippine President Marcos,
holding head of state immunity inapplicable to former
official).
3. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997)
(denying claim of head of state immunity by Panamanian
General Manuel Noriega because, by prosecuting Noriega,
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Executive Branch manifested its intention not to recognize
any immunity).
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing
dismissal of private civil litigation against former Bosnian
Serb insurgent leader Karadzic, where United States, as
amicus, repudiated defendant's claim to head of state
immunity).
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (denying
motion to dismiss suit against former military ruler Prosper
Avril under head of state immunity principles where Haiti
waived immunity).
United States v. Marcos, No. 87-CR-598, 1990 WL 29368
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1990) (declining to dismiss criminal
charges against wife of former Philippine President Marcos
on grounds of head of state immunity where Philippines
waived immunity).
In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to recognize
head of state immunity for former Philippine President
Marcos in grand jury proceedings where Philippines waived
immunity).
Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F.
Supp. 782 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (declining to dismiss suit
against former Philippine President Marcos on basis of head
of state immunity where neither United States nor
Philippine government requested immunity).
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe No. 700, 817 F.2d 1108
(4th Cir. 1987) (declining to recognize head of state immunity
for former Philippine President Marcos in grand jury
proceedings where Philippines waived immunity).
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1986) (refusing to recognize head of state immunity for
former Philippine President Marcos, where Executive
Branch repudiated claimed immunity).

Executive Branch Suggestion of Head of State Immunity
Not Accepted
1. In re Wilson, 94 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (declining
to accept executive branch suggestion of immunity for
Egyptian President Mubarak and another official because
suggestion could be asserted in any subsequent litigation
against the officials).
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B: THE TAFT LETTER

THE LEGAL ADVISER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

By fax and US mail
Robert D. McCallum, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr

:

December 6, 2002

-

Plaintiffs A, B, C et al. v. Jiang Zemin, et al., Civil
Action No. 02C 7530, is a civil action pending in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The suit names Jiang Zemin, the President of the People's
Republic of China, as a defendant.
President Jiang is the sitting Head of State of the
People's Republic of China. In light of this status, the
Government of the PRC has formally requested that the
Government of the United States take all steps necessary to
have this action against President Jiang dismissed.
The Department of State recognizes and allows the
immunity of President Jiang from this suit. Under customary
rules of international law, recognized and applied in the
United States, President Jiang is immune from the
jurisdiction of the United States courts in this case.
Accordingly, the Department of State requests that the
Department of Justice submit to the district court an
appropriate Suggestion of Immunity in this case.
This letter recognizes the particular importance
attached by the United States to obtaining the prompt
dismissal of the present proceedings against President Jiang
in view of the significant foreign policy implications of
such an action against the President of a friendly foreign
State.
Sincerely,

William H. Taft, IV
cc:

Vincent Garvey, Esq.
Federal Programs Branch

